From July 31 through August 14, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals issued a busy docket spanning domestic relations, workers’ compensation, administrative and agency disputes, juvenile matters, and civil litigation.

The difference from a docket made up solely of memorandum affirmances is significant: this three-week period included published opinions with concrete guidance for lawyers. The most useful opinions address three recurring practice problems:

1. preserving a child-support calculation issue for appeal;

2. making the express findings required for an alimony award; and

3. determining when a payment-processing fee is distinct from a statutorily capped price or markup.

The Court also issued numerous unpublished memorandum affirmances and rehearing dispositions. Those resolve the individual cases, but they generally do not create citable precedent. This update focuses on the published holdings that practitioners can actually use.

July 31: Avery v. Avery—preservation, custody, and statutory alimony findings

Avery v. Avery, CL-2025-0787, is the most consequential domestic-relations decision in this group. The Court affirmed the trial court’s child-support and custody determinations, but reversed the alimony award and remanded for the statutory findings required by Ala. Code § 30-2-57.

Child-support calculations must be preserved

The husband argued on appeal that the trial court had used the wrong income figure in calculating child support. The Court held that the argument was not preserved because the husband had not presented that alleged error to the trial court in a postjudgment motion.

That is a practical warning for family-law counsel. When the alleged error concerns the calculation of income, the application of a guideline figure, or another factual component of the child-support determination, counsel should not assume that a general postjudgment challenge is enough. The asserted calculation error must be presented to the trial court with sufficient specificity to permit correction before appeal.

Judge Edwards concurred in part and in the result, explaining that she would have reached the merits because the CS-42 form incorporated into the judgment reflected factual findings regarding income. The majority holding, however, is the operative instruction: preservation remains essential.

Domestic-violence findings carry statutory custody consequences

The Court also affirmed the award of sole physical and sole legal custody to the wife. The trial court had found that the husband committed domestic violence. That finding triggered the statutory presumptions in Ala. Code §§ 30-3-131 and 30-3-133 against placing a child in the perpetrator’s sole, joint legal, or joint physical custody and in favor of residence with the non-perpetrating parent.

The case reinforces two practice points:

• A domestic-violence finding should be addressed directly in the evidence, requested findings, and proposed judgment; and

• The litigation consequences extend beyond visitation. The finding affects physical custody, legal custody, decision-making authority, and the statutory analysis of the child’s best interests.

An alimony label is not an alimony finding

The trial court awarded the wife 36 months of “periodic rehabilitative alimony.” The Court of Civil Appeals reversed because the judgment did not include the express findings required by § 30-2-57(a): that the recipient lacks a sufficient separate estate to preserve the marital economic status quo, that the payor can provide support without undue hardship, and that the circumstances make an award equitable.

The Court also recognized that property division and alimony are interrelated. Once it reversed the alimony award, it declined to review the claimed inequity in the property division and directed reconsideration of the property division together with the alimony determination.

For family-law lawyers, the drafting lesson is direct: a judgment should not merely announce alimony. It should contain the statutory findings that support the award and should treat the property division and alimony analysis as connected decisions.

July 31: Harris v. Lineage Logistics—scheduled injuries remain scheduled absent the recognized exception

In Harris v. Lineage Logistics, CL-2025-1033, the Court affirmed a workers’ compensation judgment limiting an employee to scheduled-member benefits for partial finger amputations, even though the trial court found the employee permanently and totally disabled.

The employee argued that the court should first determine whether he was permanently and totally disabled and only then decide whether the scheduled-injury provision applied. The Court rejected that position as inconsistent with binding Alabama Supreme Court precedent.

The controlling framework remains that an injury to a scheduled member is compensated under the schedule unless the employee proves a recognized exception—principally, that the effects of the loss extend to other parts of the body and interfere with their efficiency. The Court noted that the employee had not argued that exception or the separate debilitating-pain exception.

The practitioner takeaway is not simply that scheduled injuries are limited. It is that the theory must be pleaded, developed, and supported at trial. Evidence of severe vocational loss alone does not remove a case from the schedule. Counsel must focus on the legally recognized path out of the schedule: extension of the injury’s effects to other parts of the body, or another established exception.

August 7: Alabama Beverage Licensees Association v. Stewart—a transaction-specific convenience fee is not automatically a prohibited markup

In Alabama Beverage Licensees Association v. Stewart, CL-2026-0014, the Court rejected a challenge to the Alabama ABC Board’s credit-card convenience fee for wholesale case-lot liquor purchases.

The plaintiffs argued that the fee effectively increased the statutory cap on the ABC Board’s wholesale markup. The Court held that the fee was not a markup of the liquor’s wholesale cost. It was a separate, optional, transaction-specific charge imposed only on purchasers who elected to pay by credit card. The Court also relied on Ala. Code § 41-1-60(e), which authorizes state entities accepting credit-card payments to impose a surcharge or convenience fee to offset qualifying administrative charges.

The broader statutory-construction lesson is useful beyond alcohol regulation: a fee associated with a chosen payment method is not necessarily part of the regulated price of the underlying good or service. The statute’s text, the definition of the capped item, the optional nature of the fee, and the existence of separate statutory authority for the fee all mattered.

August 14: a busy memorandum docket, but no new published civil doctrine

The August 14 Civil Appeals docket included memorandum affirmances in matters such as Kuiper v. Kuiper, Dewberry v. Dewberry, West v. Ginn, and several DHR appeals. In Diaz v. Diaz, the Court granted rehearing, withdrew its earlier memorandum, substituted a new memorandum, and affirmed.

Those entries matter to the parties and counsel involved. They do not, however, supply new citable doctrine for the broader civil bar. Under Rule 54, a no-opinion affirmance or memorandum from the Court of Civil Appeals generally has no precedential value and may not be cited in arguments or briefs, except for specified preclusion-related purposes. Ala. R. App. P. 54.

That distinction is important. A high-volume docket does not necessarily signal a high-volume body of new law. Lawyers should obtain and analyze the memorandum in their own cases, but they should not infer broad holdings from captions, outcomes, or the fact of an affirmance.

Bottom line

The July 31, August 7, and August 14 Civil Appeals dockets produced three practical published lessons:

• preserve specific child-support calculation errors in the trial court;

• make the express statutory findings required for alimony, and recognize the effect of domestic-violence findings on custody; and

• distinguish a regulated price or markup from an optional, transaction-specific payment-processing fee.

The remaining memorandum and rehearing entries are procedurally important to the litigants involved, but they do not change the published law available to other practitioners.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It summarizes selected published Alabama Court of Civil Appeals opinions and publicly available memorandum and rehearing entries issued July 31, August 7, and August 14, 2026. Lawyers should review the complete decision, statutes, rules, and record applicable to each matter.

Reports say that Daniels sent LSU a cease-and-desist letter objecting to the school’s continued use of his NIL after LSU assigned No. 5, the number Daniels wore during his Heisman-winning season, to another player. The available reporting describes a pre-suit letter rather than a public lawsuit, and the full letter does not appear to have been publicly released. That distinction matters: the public discussion has tended to collapse two separate questions into one.

The first is whether LSU may continue to make commercial use of Jayden Daniels’s identifiable NIL. The second is whether Daniels can prevent LSU from reissuing No. 5. Those are not the same legal claim—and the second is substantially more difficult on the reported facts.

NIL protects identity, not every symbol associated with an athlete

NIL is often used as shorthand for an athlete’s commercial identity: name, photograph, voice, signature, likeness, social-media persona, and other features that identify the athlete to consumers. The NCAA’s modern NIL framework recognizes that student-athletes may participate in legitimate commercial opportunities, while LSU’s NIL guidance separately requires written permission to use LSU’s own marks, logos, copyrights, or facilities. In other words, athlete rights and school IP rights can coexist in the same campaign.

A player’s jersey number may help identify that player, but it is not automatically the player’s property. A number becomes legally significant when it functions with other facts as part of a recognizable commercial identity—or when it has been protected through a specific contract, trademark registration, licensing arrangement, or brand campaign.

That is why the better question is not, “Who owns No. 5?” It is: What is LSU using, in what commercial context, and what rights did the parties allocate by contract?

The number alone is unlikely to decide the dispute

Athletic numbers can be protected as trademarks in the right circumstances, but trademark protection does not arise merely because a number is famous or emotionally connected to a player. The owner must establish protectable rights in a mark and, generally, a likelihood that consumers will be confused about source, sponsorship, affiliation, or approval.

The sports-world dispute in PBTM LLC v. Football Northwest, LLC illustrates the point. That litigation involved competing claims related to “12” branding connected to Seahawks fandom. The court’s analysis focused on actual trademark rights, contractual allocations, and likelihood of consumer confusion—not a generalized right to control a number. PBTM LLC v. Football Nw., LLC, No. C19-2081-RSL (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2022).

Applied here, LSU’s assignment of No. 5 to a current player, without more, is unlikely by itself to establish that LSU is commercially exploiting Daniels’s identity or misleading consumers into believing Daniels endorsed the new player. Reissuing a uniform number is ordinarily part of a team’s management of its own roster, uniforms, and traditions.

That conclusion could change if the surrounding presentation does the identifying work. For example, a campaign that pairs No. 5 with Daniels’s name, image, Heisman-era highlights, signature phrases, or an explicit suggestion that he approved the promotion presents a different analysis from placing No. 5 on a current athlete’s jersey.

The potentially stronger issue: continued commercial use of Daniels’s NIL

The reported letter’s legal force may lie less in the number itself and more in the allegation that LSU continues to use Daniels’s NIL after the relevant authorization ended. That claim would be fact-specific. Critical documents would include:

• any NIL, media, merchandising, licensing, or appearance agreement involving Daniels, LSU, its athletic department, a conference, a collective, or a licensing agent;

• the agreement’s scope, duration, termination rights, and post-term use provisions;

• releases governing game footage, photography, archival content, social media, and merchandise;

• the particular advertisements, products, videos, or promotions challenged; and

• evidence of whether the use implies Daniels’s current endorsement or affiliation.

Contract often does more work than headline-level NIL terminology. If an agreement granted LSU a perpetual or continuing right to use certain historical images and footage, a demand to stop that use may be limited by the agreement’s language. If the authorization was narrow, expired, or excluded commercial merchandising, Daniels’s position becomes stronger.

The broader NIL litigation history shows why identifiability matters. In the college-football video-game litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that a right-of-publicity claim could proceed where a game allegedly recreated a former player with a matching combination of physical characteristics, playing attributes, team context, and jersey number—even though names were omitted. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation v. Electronic Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). The legal takeaway is not that any jersey number belongs to an athlete; it is that a sufficiently realistic combination of details can identify an athlete for commercial purposes.

Louisiana adds an important wrinkle

Because LSU is located in Louisiana, state-law publicity claims deserve particular attention. Louisiana does recognize privacy interests that can include appropriation of a living person’s name or likeness, but its appellate courts have been cautious about creating a broad, freestanding right of publicity without legislative direction.

In Frigon v. Universal Pictures, Inc., the Louisiana First Circuit declined to recognize the asserted post-mortem right-of-publicity claim as a new cause of action absent legislative action. Frigon v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 255 So. 3d 591 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2018). That case did not involve a living athlete’s current NIL dispute, and it does not answer Daniels’s potential claims. But it does underscore why an athlete in Louisiana should not assume that a broad “right of publicity” label resolves the issue. Contract, trademark, false-endorsement theory, privacy/appropriation principles, and the governing law clause may be decisive.

Schools and athletes should separate the rights at the outset

This dispute is a practical drafting lesson for athletic departments, collectives, licensees, and athletes. Their agreements should state, in plain terms:

• whether the school may use the athlete’s name, image, likeness, jersey number, signature, or social-media content;

• whether the use is limited to recruiting, news, archival content, fundraising, ticketing, merchandising, or third-party licensing;

• whether the school may use historical content after the athlete leaves;

• whether a uniform number can be promoted as associated with the athlete after departure;

• whether the athlete has approval or notice rights for commercial campaigns; and

• who owns, controls, and enforces any trademarks developed around the athlete’s personal brand.

The school must also protect its side of the line. LSU’s published NIL guidance states that use of LSU trademarks, logos, copyrights, or facilities requires written permission. A player can commercialize personal identity rights without obtaining ownership of the institution’s uniforms, marks, or brand assets.

The bottom line

Jayden Daniels may have legitimate concerns if LSU is using his identifiable NIL in new commercial promotions outside the scope of any release or license. But the proposition that No. 5, standing alone, is legally “his NIL” is too broad.

A number can be part of a commercially recognizable identity. It can be protected in a tailored trademark or contract arrangement. And it can contribute to an actionable use when combined with enough identifying features to invoke a particular athlete. But a jersey number is not automatically an athlete-owned asset simply because fans connect it to that athlete.

For LSU, Daniels, and other college sports stakeholders, the practical issue is not sentimental ownership of a number. It is careful allocation of identity rights, institutional IP, commercial permissions, and post-term use before the athlete becomes a national brand.

This article addresses reported facts and general legal principles, not legal advice. The reported cease-and-desist letter has not been publicly filed as a lawsuit, and the full agreement history between Daniels and LSU is not public.

The Court’s five latest available entries are all dated July 10, 2026. Each is a certificate of judgment denying a petition for writ of certiorari without opinion.

That makes this a finality docket, not a new-doctrine docket. The orders end Supreme Court review in the individual matters and leave the underlying appellate dispositions in place, but they do not explain the Court’s reasoning, resolve a new legal issue, or create a new Supreme Court precedent.

The five latest entries

Case

Supreme Court docket

Lower court identified in the certificate

July 10 action

Ex parte Wilson

SC-2026-0471

Mobile Circuit Court CC-16-6799.61; Court of Criminal Appeals CR-2025-0427

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

Ex parte Myers

SC-2026-0369

Calhoun Circuit Court CV-25-900033; Court of Civil Appeals CL-2025-0533

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

Ex parte Sanders

SC-2026-0445

Montgomery Circuit Court CC-21-395.60; Court of Criminal Appeals CR-2025-0624

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

Ex parte Brown

SC-2026-0447

Dallas Circuit Court CC-77-341.62; Court of Criminal Appeals CR-2025-0850

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

Ex parte Sawyer

SC-2026-0421

Jefferson Circuit Court CC-02-2899.63; Court of Criminal Appeals CR-2025-0747

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

What a no-opinion certiorari denial does—and does not—do

The July 10 orders show that the Court considered each petition and declined discretionary review. They do not state why review was denied. A denial therefore should not be characterized as the Supreme Court’s endorsement of every rationale in the Court of Criminal Appeals or Court of Civil Appeals decision below.

Equally important, these certificates are not opinions on the underlying criminal or civil claims. The public entries identify the originating trial and intermediate appellate docket numbers, but do not disclose the offense, civil cause of action, arguments raised in the petitions, or the legal analysis in the lower appellate rulings. Practitioners should obtain and analyze the underlying Court of Appeals disposition and certiorari papers before advising a client about the substantive effect of any individual denial.

The immediate procedural consequence: Supreme Court review is over

Each July 10 entry is styled as a certificate of judgment. Under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, when the Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari, the certificate of judgment issues immediately. The certificates in these five cases expressly state that the Court’s judgment is certified on July 10 and address costs under Rule 35. Ala. R. App. P. 41.

For the parties, the practical consequence is that the Supreme Court phase has ended. Counsel should then confirm the resulting status in the intermediate appellate court and trial court, assess any further relief potentially available under the governing procedural framework, and communicate the finality consequences promptly to the client.

Criminal appellate practice: four of the five newest entries

Four of the five latest entries—Wilson, Sanders, Brown, and Sawyer—are petitions for certiorari from decisions of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.

For criminal practitioners, the recurring reminder is that Supreme Court certiorari is discretionary and tightly framed. In ordinary criminal cases, a rehearing application in the Court of Criminal Appeals is generally a prerequisite to certiorari. The certiorari petition must be filed within 14 days after the Court of Criminal Appeals acts on rehearing and must identify a recognized ground for review, such as a material first-impression question, conflict with specified appellate authority, or a qualifying constitutional or statutory ruling. Ala. R. App. P. 39.

A no-opinion denial underscores a practical point: counsel should develop the certiorari theory before the petition is due, not treat the petition as an opportunity to reargue every assignment of error. The petition must make the Rule 39 ground and the factual basis for it intelligible from the petition materials. When the underlying Court of Criminal Appeals disposition is an unpublished memorandum or lacks an adequate factual account, the statement-of-facts steps taken on rehearing can materially affect the Supreme Court’s ability to evaluate the petition.

Post-denial checklist for criminal counsel

• Obtain the Supreme Court certificate of judgment and preserve the lower appellate decision, rehearing materials, and certiorari petition in the client file.

• Confirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ certificate-of-judgment and remand status, if applicable.

• Review the disposition to determine what became final: conviction, sentence, postconviction ruling, or other criminal judgment. The Supreme Court certificates alone do not answer that question.

• Evaluate any remaining client-specific options under the appropriate procedural rules without representing that a no-opinion certiorari denial itself decided a new substantive issue.

• Give the client a clear written finality update that distinguishes the denial of discretionary review from an opinion on the merits.

The civil entry: Ex parte Myers

Ex parte Myers is the sole latest-entry petition from the Court of Civil Appeals. Its certificate identifies a Calhoun Circuit Court case involving the Board of Trustees of the Policemen’s and Firemen’s Retirement Fund, followed by Court of Civil Appeals case CL-2025-0533. The Supreme Court denied the petition without opinion and issued its certificate of judgment.

The same caution applies. The denial establishes that discretionary Supreme Court review will not proceed in that matter; it does not reveal which issue was raised, whether the Court agreed with the Court of Civil Appeals’ analysis, or what substantive proposition the lower decision supports. Attorneys working with the resulting Court of Civil Appeals disposition should assess its precedential status independently and read the decision itself rather than citing the certiorari denial as substantive approval.

Bottom line

The five latest Alabama Supreme Court entries are procedural dispositions issued on one day, not a set of five new merits opinions. They show the endpoint of discretionary review:

• all five petitions were denied without opinion;

• the Supreme Court certified its judgment the same day; and

• the operative substantive analysis, if any, remains in the underlying Court of Criminal Appeals or Court of Civil Appeals decisions.

For appellate practitioners, the useful lesson is disciplined certiorari practice and finality management. Build the Rule 39 ground early, preserve the necessary facts on rehearing, and treat a certiorari denial as an event that ends Supreme Court review—not as a judicial opinion resolving the issues presented.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It summarizes the five latest Alabama Supreme Court entries available before July 17, 2026, as reflected in the linked certificates of judgment and procedural rules.

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals issued 12 reported docket entries on July 17, 2026. Five are published opinions with concrete practice consequences; five are affirmances by unpublished memorandum; and two are orders overruling rehearing without an opinion on rehearing.

The published opinions share a practical theme: appellate outcomes often turn on procedure before the court ever reaches the merits. The Court addressed (1) how to compute and protect appeals from district court, (2) when a workers’ compensation claimant may obtain compelled medical care before proving compensability, (3) the finality hazards created by imprecise custody and juvenile orders, and (4) the highly deferential review of a joint-custody modification tried ore tenus.

The July 17 docket at a glance

Category

Decision

Disposition

Principal practice point

District-court appeal / jurisdiction

Ex parte Ford, CL-2026-0005

Mandamus granted in part

Claim-specific appeal periods and a clerk’s filing error can produce a split jurisdictional result.

Custody modification

Brazeale v. Gibson, CL-2025-0868

Affirmed

In a true joint-physical-custody modification, the Couch best-interest standard applies, but ore tenus deference remains formidable.

Juvenile / finality / adoption

K.W. v. B.P., CL-2025-0702 et al.

Appeals dismissed; mandamus denied

Consolidated actions retain separate identities, and a reservation of visitation for later reconsideration may defeat finality.

Domestic relations / finality

Conlee v. Conlee, CL-2026-0089

Appeal dismissed

A custody-modification order that leaves a tried legal-custody claim unresolved is not final.

Workers’ compensation

Ex parte Waterville USA, Inc., CL-2026-0390

Mandamus granted

Voluntary benefits and an authorized physician’s referral do not eliminate the need for an evidentiary basis when compensability remains disputed.

Memorandum affirmances

A.L. (CL-2025-1023); A.L. (CL-2025-1026); Roden; Carroll; Triggs

Affirmed by unpublished memorandum

Dispositions resolve the individual appeals but do not add citable precedent.

Rehearing dispositions

G.M.B. v. J.J.B.; Miller v. Hickman

Rehearing overruled

Procedural finality events; the July 17 notices state no additional reasoning.

1. Ex parte Ford: Treat the appeal deadline as claim-specific, and do not let a clerk’s error obscure the analysis

Ex parte Ford arose from a district-court action involving a mobile-home purchase agreement, a detinue claim for the home, and an unlawful-detainer claim for the lot. After the circuit court entered an interlocutory order favorable to the defendant on appeal, the plaintiff sought mandamus, arguing that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the appeal from district court was untimely.

The Court’s result was deliberately divided. It held that the appeal of the unlawful-detainer component was untimely and directed dismissal of that portion. It held that the appeals of the breach-of-contract and detinue components were timely—despite their later file stamp—because the appellant had made a timely, good-faith attempt to file them but the clerk refused the filing based on an erroneous demand for a supersedeas bond.

The holdings practitioners should use

• Do not assume the Alabama Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act supplies the appeal rule. The Court concluded that the AURLTA did not govern a purchaser’s occupancy under a contract of sale of a mobile home or a separate lot-only agreement. The transaction’s labels and the property actually rented matter.

• Identify the deadline claim by claim. The unlawful-detainer claim was subject to its own seven-day appeal provision; the contract and detinue claims were subject to the general 14-day district-court civil appeal period. A combined complaint does not create a single universal appellate deadline.

• A late order cannot revive a postjudgment motion already denied by operation of law. The district court’s postjudgment motion had expired under Rule 59.1(dc) before the court purported to deny it in writing. That later order was a nullity for deadline purposes.

• Equitable treatment of clerk error has a hard boundary. Under the Court’s application of Ex parte G.L.C., a litigant who timely tenders a filing but is wrongly rebuffed by judicial staff may be treated as timely. But equitable relief cannot repair a failure to tender the filing before the statutory deadline.

• A supersedeas bond is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal. The Court held that the clerk erred by refusing the notice of appeal for failure to post a bond equal to twice the judgment; Rule 62(dc) and the applicable authorities do not make such a bond a jurisdictional condition to an appeal.

Practice takeaway

For any district-court appeal involving mixed claims, prepare a deadline matrix before filing: list each claim, its governing statute or rule, the postjudgment-motion deadline, the deemed-denial date, and the notice-of-appeal deadline. If a clerk refuses a timely tender, preserve proof immediately—time, office, employee, reason given, and tendered documents. A later declaration that a filing was blocked may be vital, but it will not help where the statutory deadline had already expired.

2. Ex parte Waterville USA: A referral is not a substitute for proof of compensability

In Ex parte Waterville USA, Inc., a workers’ compensation claimant sought to compel an employer to schedule a second-opinion consultation recommended by an authorized treating physician. The employer had denied liability and disputed compensability, causation, and permanent injury. The circuit court granted the motion without receiving evidence; the Court of Civil Appeals issued mandamus directing that the order be vacated.

The Court applied Ex parte Publix Super Markets, Inc.: where compensability is genuinely disputed, a claimant cannot obtain compelled medical treatment through a stand-alone pretrial motion based only on allegations. The court must have a procedurally proper basis—such as a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment—or an evidentiary determination of the threshold facts supporting entitlement to treatment.

What the decision means in practice

• Payers should distinguish voluntary benefits from acceptance of liability. The employer’s prior payment of medical and temporary-total-disability benefits did not admit compensability. The Court relied on both the Workers’ Compensation Act and Rule 409 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence in rejecting an estoppel theory.

• Claimants should select the correct procedural vehicle. If compensability is denied, a motion to compel alone is not enough. Counsel should consider whether the record supports summary judgment, an evidentiary hearing on compensability, or an expedited trial process consistent with the Act.

• An authorized provider’s recommendation does not resolve a live compensability dispute. The referral principle recognized in cases involving accepted claims does not override an employer’s preserved right to contest whether the underlying injury is compensable.

• Mandamus remains the vehicle for correcting an improper interlocutory treatment order. The employer filed within the presumptively reasonable Rule 21 period and obtained relief before being required to fund disputed treatment.

3. K.W. v. B.P.: Consolidation does not merge cases, and a provisional visitation arrangement is not final

K.W. v. B.P. involved six related juvenile matters—dependency and custody actions plus a transferred adoption proceeding. The juvenile court entered an order in one numbered action that purported to resolve claims across several consolidated cases, awarded custody to nonparent custodians, and reserved the ability to adjust the mother’s visitation through a future date. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed all appeals from the dependency/custody actions as nonfinal and denied the mother’s mandamus petition seeking a final judgment in the separate adoption action.

Two finality failures, two different lessons

First: consolidated cases keep their separate identities. The Court reaffirmed that a final judgment must be entered in each distinct action. An order captioned and entered only in one case does not become final in the companion cases merely because its text discusses or purports to resolve them. Counsel should confirm the case number in the caption, the docket entry, and the actual entry of judgment in each action—particularly in juvenile cases with accumulated “.02,” “.03,” or later-numbered proceedings.

Second: do not label an order final while reserving a material custody or visitation question. The juvenile court’s order reserved jurisdiction to adjust visitation and stated that the visitation arrangement would become final later unless a party moved to reconsider it. That language signaled that the court had not reached a terminal adjudication. The Court applied its finality precedent and dismissed the appeal rather than treating the order as a final custody judgment.

Adoption-practice point

The Court also denied mandamus seeking a prompt final judgment in the transferred adoption action. The juvenile court had indicated that it would address adoption after final judgments in the intertwined dependency and custody matters. That was not a refusal to act, so the parent had not established the clear legal right and imperative duty required for mandamus.

Practice takeaway

In a multi-case family or juvenile matter, build a judgment-control sheet identifying every action number, each claim pending in that action, whether consolidation has occurred, and the judgment that must be entered in that case. Before taking an appeal, verify that the order resolves all claims in the specific case and does not defer a material aspect of custody, visitation, or support. If an appeal is premature, the client may lose time and resources while the trial court must reenter or clarify orders.

4. Conlee v. Conlee: Physical custody may be resolved while legal custody remains an unadjudicated claim

In Conlee v. Conlee, the circuit court awarded the father “custody” and the mother visitation after a modification proceeding, but did not expressly resolve the father’s request for final decision-making authority over academic and medical/dental issues. The Court of Civil Appeals interpreted “custody” in context as sole physical custody, but dismissed the appeal because the legal-custody request remained unresolved.

The decision supplies a useful distinction. The trial court’s failure to award child support did not destroy finality, because the father had withdrawn his support request and the court had memorialized that withdrawal. Nor did the failure to separately terminate the father’s former support obligation make the order nonfinal; a parent who becomes the custodial parent is no longer entitled to receive, and no longer obligated to pay, the prior support under the circumstances addressed by the Court. But a specifically requested modification of legal custody and final decision-making authority was still pending.

Drafting and trial-management lessons

• Use the statutory custody vocabulary in Ala. Code § 30-3-151. “Custody,” “primary,” or “residential” terminology can obscure whether the court has resolved physical custody, legal custody, or both.

• Plead and list physical custody, legal custody, decision-making authority, support, medical coverage, and uninsured-expense allocation as distinct requested forms of relief.

• Make sure the final judgment addresses each item actually tried, including issues tried by consent.

• Include an unambiguous residual clause where appropriate—such as preservation of unmodified provisions or denial of relief not expressly granted—but recognize that boilerplate cannot cure a judgment that is substantively unclear about a tried claim.

For appellate counsel, Conlee reinforces the need to audit finality even when neither party flags it: the Court has a duty to dismiss an appeal from a nonfinal order on its own motion.

5. Brazeale v. Gibson: The right standard is only the beginning in a joint-custody modification appeal

Brazeale v. Gibson affirmed the denial of a mother’s petition to replace an existing true joint-physical-custody arrangement with sole physical custody. The majority held that the Ex parte Couch best-interest standard—not the more demanding Ex parte McLendon standard—governed because the prior judgment awarded the parties joint physical custody with an approximately equal custodial arrangement.

That conclusion did not produce reversal. The trial court had not expressly named the governing standard, but the Court presumed the trial court knew and correctly applied the law, particularly where the mother’s postjudgment motion brought the issue to the court’s attention. The record contained conflicting testimony concerning each parent’s conduct, the child’s expressed views, mental-health concerns, and educational issues. Under ore tenus review, the appellate court declined to reweigh that evidence.

Judge Hanson, joined by Judge Bowden, dissented. The dissent viewed the record as too unclear to support a presumption that the trial court had applied the less stringent Couch standard and encouraged trial courts to state the custody standard on the record or in the judgment.

Practice takeaway

For trial counsel, Brazeale is a reminder to make the applicable modification standard explicit:

• identify the existing custody allocation precisely;

• state why Couch or McLendon governs;

• tie the evidence and proposed findings to that standard; and

• ask the court to identify the standard applied in its ruling, especially where the record presents close factual disputes.

For appellate counsel, the case shows the difficulty of converting evidence-heavy custody concerns into reversible error without a clear legal misapplication, an inadequate evidentiary basis, or a record that affirmatively demonstrates error. A postjudgment motion can preserve the standard-of-review argument, but a silent judgment will ordinarily receive the presumption that the court followed the law.

The remaining July 17 entries: outcomes without new citable doctrine

The Court also issued five affirmances by unpublished memorandum:

• A.L. v. Calhoun County Department of Human Resources, CL-2025-1023, from Calhoun Juvenile Court;

• A.L. v. Calhoun County Department of Human Resources, CL-2025-1026, from Calhoun Juvenile Court;

• Roden v. Galloway, CL-2025-0888, from DeKalb Circuit Court;

• Carroll v. Carroll, CL-2025-1025, from Shelby Circuit Court; and

• Triggs v. Triggs, CL-2025-0488, from Chilton Circuit Court.

It also overruled rehearing, without a written rehearing opinion, in G.M.B. v. J.J.B., CL-2025-0545, and Miller v. Hickman, CL-2026-0186.

Under Rule 54, a no-opinion affirmance or memorandum issued by the Court of Civil Appeals has no precedential value and cannot be cited in arguments or briefs, except for limited preclusion purposes. Ala. R. App. P. 54. Likewise, the two July 17 rehearing notices do not add reasoning beyond the Court’s earlier dispositions. Lawyers should obtain and assess the underlying memoranda and case records for client-specific review, but should not treat these short entries as broad substantive authority.

Bottom line

The Court’s July 17 docket is best read as a procedure-and-finality docket:

• protect each applicable district-court appeal deadline and document any clerk-caused filing barrier;

• do not bypass a contested compensability determination with a free-standing motion to compel workers’ compensation treatment;

• enter a separate final judgment in every consolidated action;

• resolve every pleaded or tried dimension of custody—particularly legal decision-making authority—before appealing; and

• in custody modification litigation, make the governing standard explicit and develop the record with ore tenus deference in mind.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It summarizes the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals’ July 17, 2026 docket and does not substitute for review of the complete opinions, orders, rules, and record in an individual matter.