The fastest way to make AI adoption fail is to announce that the firm is “using AI” without defining what that means.

That approach produces inconsistent experiments, uneven quality, uncertainty about confidentiality, and a predictable divide between people who adopt a tool immediately and people who refuse to touch it. None of that is a strategy.

A better approach is a controlled 90-day pilot. The purpose is not to prove that AI can do everything. It is to determine whether one approved tool can improve one defined workflow without compromising client information, professional judgment, or work quality.

Part 1 of this series explained where AI fits in a law practice: as an assistant for organizing information, locating issues, comparing documents, and creating a reviewable first draft—not as a substitute for lawyer judgment. This article turns that principle into an adoption plan.

What a pilot should accomplish

A useful pilot answers five questions:

1. What problem are we trying to solve?

2. Which workflow will we test?

3. Who owns the process and reviews the output?

4. How will we protect client information and verify quality?

5. What evidence will tell us whether to adopt, revise, expand, or stop?

The firm should be able to describe the pilot in one sentence. For example:

“For 90 days, the litigation team will use an approved AI tool to create first-pass chronologies from produced records, with attorney review before the chronology is used in a client update, deposition plan, filing, or case strategy discussion.”

That is specific enough to manage. “We are going to use AI for litigation” is not.

Choose one workflow, not an entire practice area

The strongest pilot begins with a recurring bottleneck that the firm already understands. Good candidates include:

• producing first-pass chronologies from records, discovery, or client documents;

• summarizing long transcripts or document productions for attorney review;

• comparing versions of contracts or pleadings;

• preparing internal research outlines linked to verified authorities;

• creating internal intake summaries and missing-information checklists; or

• drafting routine internal or client communications from a lawyer-approved factual record.

The best use case is usually high-volume, repetitive, document-heavy, and reviewable. It should save time at the information-organization stage while leaving legal analysis, strategy, and final approval with people.

Avoid using the first pilot for the firm’s highest-risk work. Do not begin with unreviewed client advice, court filings, settlement communications, or a workflow that requires the system to make a legal, factual, or strategic decision on its own.

Build a small pilot team

AI adoption is not solely an IT project and not solely a lawyer project. The pilot team should include people who understand the workflow, the risk, and the day-to-day operational reality.

A practical team includes:

Role

Core responsibility

Attorney sponsor

Defines the legal use case, review standard, and client-service objective.

Workflow owner

Documents the current process, trains users, gathers feedback, and identifies friction.

Participating lawyers or staff

Use the tool in real but controlled work and report what works and fails.

Technology or security contact

Confirms that the selected platform is approved and that access and information-handling expectations are understood.

Final reviewer

Reviews a sample or all output, depending on the risk of the task, before the output is used beyond the pilot team.

The team does not need to be large. In fact, smaller is better at the beginning. A pilot with two to five regular users can generate clearer feedback than a firmwide launch with no defined accountability.

Days 1–30: define the process before measuring it

The first month is for setup. The firm should document how the work is completed today, choose the approved tool, establish guardrails, and set a baseline.

Map the current workflow

Ask the people who actually do the work:

• What begins the task?

• What source documents are required?

• Who performs the first review?

• What takes the most time?

• What mistakes or omissions occur most often?

• What must be checked before the result is used?

• What does a successful output look like?

The goal is to understand the current process well enough to compare it with the pilot process. Without a baseline, “AI saved time” is only an impression.

Set the rules before use begins

The pilot should have a short written protocol that answers:

• which tool is approved;

• which matters or documents may be used in the pilot;

• what information requires additional review before submission to the tool;

• who has access;

• what output requires attorney review;

• where final work product is stored; and

• who should be notified if the tool produces an unsupported citation, a factual error, a confidentiality concern, or an unexpected result.

The protocol does not need to be a 30-page policy. It does need to be clear enough that participants do not invent different rules for themselves.

Days 31–60: run real work through a controlled process

The middle of the pilot is where the firm tests whether the workflow works in practice.

Participants should use the tool on genuine matters within the approved scope. But the pilot should still include a human checkpoint before any output becomes client work product, informs a legal strategy decision, or is filed with a court.

A simple workflow might look like this:

1. A participating user prepares the approved source materials.

2. The user runs the defined task through the approved platform.

3. The user reviews the output against the source documents.

4. The designated attorney or reviewer checks the output at the level appropriate for the task.

5. The team records the time spent, corrections made, and any issue encountered.

6. The final approved work product is saved through the firm’s normal matter-management process.

This stage should test actual work, not demonstrations. A tool may look impressive on a clean sample document and still be unhelpful when it encounters incomplete records, scanned PDFs, inconsistent dates, multiple parties, or a messy production. That is precisely what the pilot needs to reveal.

Train for judgment, not prompts

Training should focus less on clever instructions and more on professional use.

Participants should understand:

• the purpose and limits of the selected workflow;

• the source materials the tool is—and is not—receiving;

• how to ask the tool to identify uncertainty rather than invent an answer;

• how to verify facts, citations, calculations, and quotations;

• when a result should be escalated to an attorney or the pilot owner; and

• why unreviewed output cannot be sent to a client or filed with a court.

The most important training message is this: a polished answer is not necessarily a correct answer. The reviewer’s job is to confirm the result, not merely improve its wording.

Days 61–90: measure the results and decide what happens next

The final month should not be a victory lap. It should be a candid evaluation.

A useful pilot measures more than raw time savings. Firms should ask whether the process improved the work, improved the client experience, and fit the firm’s risk controls.

What to measure

Measure

Why it matters

Time to complete the task

Shows whether the workflow actually reduces effort or simply moves it to review.

Time spent on review and correction

Identifies whether the first-pass output is reliable enough to be useful.

Completeness of the output

Tests whether the tool surfaced the dates, issues, documents, or differences the reviewer needed.

Error type and frequency

Reveals whether errors are minor formatting problems or material factual, legal, or confidentiality concerns.

User adoption and feedback

A process that no one will use consistently is not ready to scale.

Client-service effect

Consider turnaround time, responsiveness, and whether attorneys gained time for counseling and strategy.

Risk-control performance

Confirms whether users followed the protocol and whether human review caught problems before external use.

The firm does not need a perfect dashboard. A short scorecard completed after each pilot task can be enough to identify the trend.

The scale-or-stop decision

At the end of 90 days, the pilot team should recommend one of four outcomes:

• Adopt: The workflow improved speed or quality, the review process worked, and the risks were manageable.

• Revise: The use case is valuable, but the protocol, training, source preparation, or review expectations need adjustment.

• Expand carefully: The workflow should move to another team or matter type, but with the same controlled process and measurement.

• Stop: The workflow did not create enough value, could not be verified efficiently, or created risks the firm could not adequately control.

Stopping a pilot is not a failure. It is evidence that the firm tested a process before making a larger investment or exposing client work to an unproven workflow.

Common mistakes to avoid

Starting with a tool instead of a problem

A firm may buy an AI product because competitors are discussing AI, then search for a reason to use it. That reverses the process. Define the workflow problem first.

Measuring only speed

A faster first draft is not useful if it creates more review work, misses material information, or confuses the client. Measure quality and review burden along with time.

Treating all work as equally risky

A first-pass chronology and a client-facing legal opinion do not require the same approval process. The firm should match supervision to the nature of the work.

Assuming adoption will happen by announcement

People need a defined task, brief training, an approved tool, a person to ask when something goes wrong, and a reason to believe the process will make their work better.

Failing to capture lessons

A pilot should create a reusable playbook: what source materials worked best, what review was needed, what errors occurred, and what instructions or safeguards improved the result. Otherwise, each new team begins from zero.

The real goal: better professional time

A good AI pilot is not about proving that a machine can write. It is about proving that the firm can use technology to reduce low-value friction while preserving the parts of legal practice that require professional responsibility.

If a tool shortens the time needed to organize records, compare documents, or prepare a reviewable first draft, the lawyer can spend more time asking the question that matters: what should the client do next?

That is the standard for success. Not more output for its own sake. Better use of trained people, better responsiveness, and better service to clients.

Bottom line

A 90-day pilot gives a firm a disciplined way to move from curiosity to evidence. Choose one use case, limit the participants, use approved technology, require human review, measure the result, and decide whether to adopt, revise, expand, or stop.

The next article in this series will address the governance layer that makes responsible adoption sustainable: confidentiality, privilege, vendor diligence, source verification, and internal quality-control rules.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Firms should evaluate their own professional obligations, client-information practices, approved technology, and supervision procedures before implementing an AI-assisted workflow.

A criminal record can affect employment, housing, licensing, education, and peace of mind long after a case ends. But the first question in an Alabama expungement review is not whether the record is old, embarrassing, or causing a problem.

It is this:

What was the final disposition of the case?

That answer often determines which expungement path may be available, what waiting period applies, what documents are needed, and whether a petition should be filed at all.

Alabama’s expungement law is not one universal remedy for every arrest or conviction. Eligibility depends on the charge, the disposition, the person’s later record, the timing, and other statutory requirements. A careful review begins with the actual court record—not assumptions about what “dismissed,” “dropped,” “resolved,” or “cleared” means.

Start with the paperwork

Before assessing eligibility, obtain the official documents that show what happened in the case. Useful records may include:

• the arrest record or booking information;

• the charging instrument, citation, complaint, indictment, or case-action summary;

• the final court disposition;

• diversion, drug-court, mental-health-court, veteran’s-court, or deferred-prosecution completion records, if applicable;

• proof that fines, costs, restitution, probation, or other requirements were completed; and

• an official criminal-history record.

The records matter because the label a person uses in everyday conversation may not match the legal disposition. For example, a case that was “dropped” may have been dismissed with prejudice, dismissed without prejudice, nolle prossed, resolved through a program, or disposed of in another way. Those distinctions can change the analysis.

Why the final disposition matters

Alabama’s expungement statutes provide different eligibility routes for misdemeanor-level matters and felony matters. In both categories, the law identifies several potential paths based on the case outcome—for example, an acquittal, a no bill, a dismissal, a nolle prosequi, a quashed indictment, or successful completion of an eligible court-approved program. The applicable waiting period and additional requirements depend on the specific route. Ala. Code § 15-27-1; Ala. Code § 15-27-2.

That means an expungement screening should begin with a disposition chart—not a yes-or-no answer based only on the charge.

Final case status

Why it matters for the initial review

Acquittal or not-guilty finding

The statutes provide a potential route after the required period has passed.

No bill

The grand jury outcome may support a petition after the applicable waiting period.

Dismissal with prejudice

This disposition has a separate statutory path.

Nolle prosequi without conditions

The analysis includes timing and whether the charge was refiled.

Dismissal after a court-approved program

Completion documentation and the applicable post-completion period matter.

Dismissal without prejudice

The waiting period and later record can be critical, and the analysis differs by offense level.

Conviction

Convictions require separate analysis; eligibility is not assumed merely because time has passed.

Misdemeanor, traffic, and municipal cases

For eligible misdemeanor offenses, violations, traffic violations, and municipal-ordinance violations, Alabama law includes several nonconviction paths to a petition. It also permits petitions involving certain qualifying convictions after completion of all probation or parole requirements and payment of required amounts, passage of the statutory period, and satisfaction of other eligibility conditions.

But not every misdemeanor-level conviction is eligible. The statute contains exclusions and conditions, including provisions addressing violent offenses, sex offenses, offenses involving moral turpitude, serious traffic offenses, and certain commercial-driving circumstances. Ala. Code § 15-27-1.

The practical lesson is simple: a misdemeanor case is not automatically expungeable, but a conviction is not necessarily the end of the inquiry either.

Felony cases require their own analysis

For felony charges, Alabama law likewise provides potential expungement paths after certain nonconviction outcomes and after successful completion of specified court-approved programs. The waiting periods and conditions differ from the misdemeanor framework in important ways. Ala. Code § 15-27-2.

A felony conviction requires an even more careful review. Under the current statute, a person seeking expungement of a qualifying felony conviction must satisfy specific conditions that include obtaining a certificate of pardon with restoration of civil and political rights, waiting the required period after that certification, and meeting additional offense-based restrictions. The law excludes or limits eligibility for specified categories of offenses.

That is why the intake question should never be simply, “Was it a felony?” Counsel needs the exact offense, date, final disposition, sentence, later history, and any pardon or restoration documentation.

A petition is more than a form

An expungement petition is filed in the criminal division of the circuit court in the county where the charges were filed. The petition must be supported by a sworn statement under penalty of perjury and must include specified records, including certified case information and an official Alabama criminal-history record. It must identify the charges, the arresting agency, and relevant booking or detention agencies. The petitioner must also serve the district attorney, law-enforcement agency, and clerk of court. Ala. Code § 15-27-3.

The process may involve an objection from the prosecuting authority or a victim. Under the current procedure, an objection requires the court to set a hearing no sooner than 30 days after the objection is filed. At a hearing, the court reviews the relevant documentation and arguments; the Alabama Rules of Evidence apply. Even when no objection is filed, the court decides the petition on its merits. Act 427, SB 88.

In other words, eligibility is necessary, but it is not the only question. The petition must be accurate, complete, properly supported, and filed in the correct court.

What an expungement order can do—and what it does not do

When an expungement petition is granted, Alabama law generally directs the expungement of court and agency records related to the matter, subject to statutory exceptions. The proceedings are generally deemed never to have occurred, and courts and agencies ordinarily respond to inquiries as though no record exists. The statute also generally provides that the person whose record was expunged need not disclose the record on employment, credit, or other applications. Ala. Code § 15-27-6.

But expungement is not the same as saying the matter disappears for every purpose. The statute includes exceptions and disclosure obligations, including circumstances involving government regulatory or licensing agencies, utilities and their agents or affiliates, and banks or other financial institutions. Other statutory provisions also govern access to expunged records in specified contexts.

That is why an expungement consultation should include the client’s actual objective. Is the record causing an employment problem? A professional-licensing issue? A housing concern? A background-check question? A firearm or civil-rights question? The answer may affect what additional advice the client needs after the expungement analysis.

The Alabama expungement intake checklist

A person considering expungement should gather the following before meeting with counsel:

Item

Why it matters

Case number and county

Identifies the court with jurisdiction and the correct records to obtain.

Exact charge or charges

Eligibility can depend on the specific offense, not the client’s general description of the case.

Final disposition

This is the starting point for determining a possible statutory route.

Date of the disposition or program completion

Waiting periods are measured from particular events.

Proof of completed conditions

Probation, restitution, fines, costs, treatment, or program requirements may matter.

Official criminal-history record

The statute requires an official record and later history can affect eligibility.

Information about charges that were refiled or remain pending

A dismissal may not support a petition if the matter was refiled or remains unresolved.

Any prior expungement petitions or orders

The sworn statement must address prior expungement applications and grants.

The client’s practical concern

Helps identify related issues involving employment, housing, licensing, or background checks.

Five questions to ask before assuming a record can be expunged

1. What does the official court record say happened?

2. What was the exact offense level and final disposition?

3. How much time has passed since the relevant event?

4. Were all court-ordered and program requirements completed?

5. Has anything happened since then that affects the statutory analysis?

Those questions do not replace a legal review. They make the review faster, more accurate, and less likely to rest on incomplete information.

Bottom line

The final disposition is the starting point—not the ending point—of an Alabama expungement analysis. A favorable result, a completed program, a long-past conviction, or an old arrest may create a possible path, but each path has its own requirements.

The most productive first step is to gather the official record, identify the exact disposition, and review the case under the current expungement statutes. That approach helps clients understand whether they may have a path forward and helps counsel prepare a complete, supportable petition when expungement is available.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Eligibility for expungement depends on the current law, the specific charge and disposition, applicable waiting periods, the person’s record, and other facts. A person considering expungement should seek advice about the particular case and records involved.

ABC and Disney’s reported lawsuit challenging the FCC’s early review of certain ABC broadcast licenses raises a constitutional question that reaches beyond one network, one regulator, or one administration:

When does ordinary licensing oversight become unconstitutional pressure on speech?

The reported theory is not that broadcasters are immune from regulation. They are not. Broadcast licenses exist within a statutory system administered by the Federal Communications Commission, and renewal decisions are governed by federal law. The theory is narrower—and more serious: the government may not use the leverage of a broadcast license to punish, suppress, or coerce editorial choices protected by the First Amendment.

This post examines that legal theory. It does not assume that the allegations are proved, and it does not attempt to reproduce the reporting that prompted the discussion. The key legal issue is whether the challenged FCC action was a good-faith application of the agency’s renewal authority or an effort to use regulatory power as a weapon against disfavored speech.

The regulatory backdrop: broadcast licenses are real government authority

The FCC has significant authority over broadcast licensing. The Communications Act provides for broadcast licenses and sets the standards for renewal. Under 47 U.S.C. § 309(k), the FCC evaluates whether a licensee has served the public interest, committed serious violations of the Communications Act or FCC rules, or engaged in a pattern of abuse.

The FCC’s publicly available materials state that it relied on its early-renewal authority under 47 C.F.R. § 73.3539 in directing certain ABC-owned stations to submit renewal applications before their ordinary renewal dates. The agency’s May 2026 notice established the related pleading cycle and referenced an investigation into possible violations of the Communications Act and FCC rules. FCC public notice, DA 26-541.

That statutory and regulatory backdrop matters. A network cannot defeat a lawful regulatory action merely by describing it as pressure on speech. The First Amendment theory must therefore do more than show that the FCC acted. It must show that the FCC acted because of protected expression, or used its regulatory authority in a way that unlawfully coerced or chilled protected editorial conduct.

The constitutional theory: retaliation and coercion

A First Amendment claim in this setting is likely to combine two related ideas.

Retaliation

The government generally may not impose adverse action in retaliation for protected speech. In a licensing context, the alleged adverse action is not necessarily a completed revocation. It may be an investigation, accelerated renewal proceeding, threat of nonrenewal, or other regulatory step that imposes a meaningful burden because of the speaker’s protected expression.

The central factual question is motive: was the agency enforcing a valid rule through ordinary regulatory means, or was it using its authority to penalize the licensee’s editorial choices?

Coercion

The government may also violate the First Amendment when it uses informal or indirect pressure to suppress protected speech. In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), the Supreme Court held that government officials could not accomplish censorship through informal pressure that they could not impose directly.

More recently, National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo, 144 S. Ct. 1316 (2024), reaffirmed that officials may not use their regulatory authority to coerce private entities into punishing or suppressing disfavored advocacy.

ABC’s reported theory appears to invoke that line of cases: the FCC’s licensing power is a potent regulatory tool, and a network may argue that an early-renewal proceeding becomes unconstitutional if it is used to pressure newsroom or programming decisions rather than to enforce neutral broadcast obligations.

The difficult part: proving an unconstitutional use of lawful power

The case will likely turn less on whether the FCC possesses early-renewal authority in the abstract and more on how that authority was used here.

A court evaluating a retaliation or coercion theory may examine:

• The stated regulatory basis. What statute, rule, or licensee obligation did the FCC identify, and how does the asserted conduct fit that authority?

• The factual record. What evidence supported the agency’s concerns when it initiated the early-renewal process?

• Timing. Did the regulatory action follow public criticism of particular programming, reporting, or editorial decisions?

• Comparators. Has the FCC used the same process against similarly situated licensees, or was the action unusually targeted?

• Public and private communications. Did officials link regulatory consequences to particular speech, editorial choices, or content decisions?

• The remedy sought. Is the agency pursuing a normal licensing inquiry, or is the process structured in a manner that threatens to impose disproportionate pressure before an ordinary renewal cycle?

No single factor is necessarily dispositive. The core inquiry is whether the government’s stated regulatory explanation is a legitimate, neutral basis for action or a pretext for punishing speech.

Why broadcast regulation makes the theory especially sensitive

Broadcasting is regulated in ways that most other media are not. A broadcast station needs a federal license to operate, and its license is subject to renewal standards. That reality gives the FCC real authority—and it also makes the First Amendment concern more acute when the regulator is alleged to be targeting editorial content.

The government can enforce valid, content-neutral obligations. But a licensing agency cannot use a supposedly neutral process as a mechanism to demand favorable coverage, punish criticism, or influence editorial judgment.

The concern is not limited to formal revocation. A prolonged or accelerated regulatory proceeding can itself impose significant cost, uncertainty, management burden, and reputational pressure. If that pressure is imposed because of protected speech, the claimed injury is not simply administrative inconvenience. It is the chilling effect created when a speaker must choose between editorial independence and regulatory peace.

The FCC’s likely defense

The FCC is likely to argue that it is doing exactly what Congress authorized: investigating potential violations and using an available procedure to obtain information necessary to decide whether the affected licenses satisfy the statutory renewal standard.

The agency will likely emphasize:

• the statutory public-interest standard for renewal;

• its authority to investigate possible violations of the Communications Act and FCC rules;

• the regulation allowing early renewal when necessary to an investigation; and

• the distinction between initiating a regulatory process and making a final decision on a license.

That defense is not trivial. Federal agencies may investigate and enforce laws even when the regulated entity is a media company. A constitutional claim cannot turn every unwelcome inquiry into a First Amendment violation.

But the existence of regulatory authority does not end the analysis. Vullo underscores that government officials cannot use otherwise lawful authority as a means of coercing private parties to suppress protected speech. The question is not merely whether the FCC had power. It is whether the alleged use of that power was constitutionally permissible.

Administrative-law questions may matter too

The reported dispute may also raise administrative-law issues separate from the First Amendment claim. A court may be asked to consider whether the FCC followed the governing statute and its own rules, adequately explained its action, acted consistently with prior practice, or relied on a sufficiently supported factual basis.

Those questions could matter even if a court does not find unconstitutional retaliation. Conversely, a strong record of irregular process, unexplained departure from past practice, or selective treatment could reinforce the argument that the stated regulatory rationale is pretextual.

The Supreme Court’s decisions involving FCC policy changes have repeatedly required agencies to provide a reasoned explanation for their actions. See, for example, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). That administrative-law framework does not decide the First Amendment claim, but it can shape the factual and legal record on which the claim depends.

Why this lawsuit matters beyond one network

The dispute is a test of institutional boundaries.

Broadcast licensees are not exempt from regulation. At the same time, the federal government cannot convert licensing oversight into an editorial-management tool. If a regulator can invoke the prospect of early renewal or nonrenewal whenever it dislikes a broadcaster’s coverage, the effect may extend far beyond the particular licensee. Other media organizations may alter reporting or programming to avoid becoming the next target.

That is why the case has significance outside traditional broadcast law. It implicates a recurring constitutional problem: how to distinguish legitimate government regulation from government pressure designed to control speech without issuing an explicit censorship order.

What to watch next

The key filings and record will matter more than the rhetoric surrounding the dispute. Watch for:

• the complaint’s specific constitutional and administrative-law claims;

• the exact FCC order or notice being challenged;

• any request for preliminary injunctive relief;

• the agency’s explanation of the factual basis for early renewal;

• evidence of public or private communications connecting regulatory action to editorial content; and

• the court’s treatment of jurisdiction, ripeness, agency-review procedures, and the merits.

Bottom line

The legal theory behind ABC’s reported lawsuit is straightforward to state but difficult to prove: the FCC may regulate broadcast licenses, but it may not use license-renewal authority to retaliate against or coerce protected editorial speech.

The case will turn on whether the early-renewal process is shown to be a neutral regulatory investigation grounded in valid licensing authority or a pretextual use of government leverage against a speaker because of its expression. That factual distinction is the constitutional fault line.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It analyzes the reported legal theory and public FCC materials relating to the ABC/Disney licensing dispute. Allegations described in a complaint are allegations unless and until established through the litigation process.

From July 31 through August 14, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals issued a busy docket spanning domestic relations, workers’ compensation, administrative and agency disputes, juvenile matters, and civil litigation.

The difference from a docket made up solely of memorandum affirmances is significant: this three-week period included published opinions with concrete guidance for lawyers. The most useful opinions address three recurring practice problems:

1. preserving a child-support calculation issue for appeal;

2. making the express findings required for an alimony award; and

3. determining when a payment-processing fee is distinct from a statutorily capped price or markup.

The Court also issued numerous unpublished memorandum affirmances and rehearing dispositions. Those resolve the individual cases, but they generally do not create citable precedent. This update focuses on the published holdings that practitioners can actually use.

July 31: Avery v. Avery—preservation, custody, and statutory alimony findings

Avery v. Avery, CL-2025-0787, is the most consequential domestic-relations decision in this group. The Court affirmed the trial court’s child-support and custody determinations, but reversed the alimony award and remanded for the statutory findings required by Ala. Code § 30-2-57.

Child-support calculations must be preserved

The husband argued on appeal that the trial court had used the wrong income figure in calculating child support. The Court held that the argument was not preserved because the husband had not presented that alleged error to the trial court in a postjudgment motion.

That is a practical warning for family-law counsel. When the alleged error concerns the calculation of income, the application of a guideline figure, or another factual component of the child-support determination, counsel should not assume that a general postjudgment challenge is enough. The asserted calculation error must be presented to the trial court with sufficient specificity to permit correction before appeal.

Judge Edwards concurred in part and in the result, explaining that she would have reached the merits because the CS-42 form incorporated into the judgment reflected factual findings regarding income. The majority holding, however, is the operative instruction: preservation remains essential.

Domestic-violence findings carry statutory custody consequences

The Court also affirmed the award of sole physical and sole legal custody to the wife. The trial court had found that the husband committed domestic violence. That finding triggered the statutory presumptions in Ala. Code §§ 30-3-131 and 30-3-133 against placing a child in the perpetrator’s sole, joint legal, or joint physical custody and in favor of residence with the non-perpetrating parent.

The case reinforces two practice points:

• A domestic-violence finding should be addressed directly in the evidence, requested findings, and proposed judgment; and

• The litigation consequences extend beyond visitation. The finding affects physical custody, legal custody, decision-making authority, and the statutory analysis of the child’s best interests.

An alimony label is not an alimony finding

The trial court awarded the wife 36 months of “periodic rehabilitative alimony.” The Court of Civil Appeals reversed because the judgment did not include the express findings required by § 30-2-57(a): that the recipient lacks a sufficient separate estate to preserve the marital economic status quo, that the payor can provide support without undue hardship, and that the circumstances make an award equitable.

The Court also recognized that property division and alimony are interrelated. Once it reversed the alimony award, it declined to review the claimed inequity in the property division and directed reconsideration of the property division together with the alimony determination.

For family-law lawyers, the drafting lesson is direct: a judgment should not merely announce alimony. It should contain the statutory findings that support the award and should treat the property division and alimony analysis as connected decisions.

July 31: Harris v. Lineage Logistics—scheduled injuries remain scheduled absent the recognized exception

In Harris v. Lineage Logistics, CL-2025-1033, the Court affirmed a workers’ compensation judgment limiting an employee to scheduled-member benefits for partial finger amputations, even though the trial court found the employee permanently and totally disabled.

The employee argued that the court should first determine whether he was permanently and totally disabled and only then decide whether the scheduled-injury provision applied. The Court rejected that position as inconsistent with binding Alabama Supreme Court precedent.

The controlling framework remains that an injury to a scheduled member is compensated under the schedule unless the employee proves a recognized exception—principally, that the effects of the loss extend to other parts of the body and interfere with their efficiency. The Court noted that the employee had not argued that exception or the separate debilitating-pain exception.

The practitioner takeaway is not simply that scheduled injuries are limited. It is that the theory must be pleaded, developed, and supported at trial. Evidence of severe vocational loss alone does not remove a case from the schedule. Counsel must focus on the legally recognized path out of the schedule: extension of the injury’s effects to other parts of the body, or another established exception.

August 7: Alabama Beverage Licensees Association v. Stewart—a transaction-specific convenience fee is not automatically a prohibited markup

In Alabama Beverage Licensees Association v. Stewart, CL-2026-0014, the Court rejected a challenge to the Alabama ABC Board’s credit-card convenience fee for wholesale case-lot liquor purchases.

The plaintiffs argued that the fee effectively increased the statutory cap on the ABC Board’s wholesale markup. The Court held that the fee was not a markup of the liquor’s wholesale cost. It was a separate, optional, transaction-specific charge imposed only on purchasers who elected to pay by credit card. The Court also relied on Ala. Code § 41-1-60(e), which authorizes state entities accepting credit-card payments to impose a surcharge or convenience fee to offset qualifying administrative charges.

The broader statutory-construction lesson is useful beyond alcohol regulation: a fee associated with a chosen payment method is not necessarily part of the regulated price of the underlying good or service. The statute’s text, the definition of the capped item, the optional nature of the fee, and the existence of separate statutory authority for the fee all mattered.

August 14: a busy memorandum docket, but no new published civil doctrine

The August 14 Civil Appeals docket included memorandum affirmances in matters such as Kuiper v. Kuiper, Dewberry v. Dewberry, West v. Ginn, and several DHR appeals. In Diaz v. Diaz, the Court granted rehearing, withdrew its earlier memorandum, substituted a new memorandum, and affirmed.

Those entries matter to the parties and counsel involved. They do not, however, supply new citable doctrine for the broader civil bar. Under Rule 54, a no-opinion affirmance or memorandum from the Court of Civil Appeals generally has no precedential value and may not be cited in arguments or briefs, except for specified preclusion-related purposes. Ala. R. App. P. 54.

That distinction is important. A high-volume docket does not necessarily signal a high-volume body of new law. Lawyers should obtain and analyze the memorandum in their own cases, but they should not infer broad holdings from captions, outcomes, or the fact of an affirmance.

Bottom line

The July 31, August 7, and August 14 Civil Appeals dockets produced three practical published lessons:

• preserve specific child-support calculation errors in the trial court;

• make the express statutory findings required for alimony, and recognize the effect of domestic-violence findings on custody; and

• distinguish a regulated price or markup from an optional, transaction-specific payment-processing fee.

The remaining memorandum and rehearing entries are procedurally important to the litigants involved, but they do not change the published law available to other practitioners.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It summarizes selected published Alabama Court of Civil Appeals opinions and publicly available memorandum and rehearing entries issued July 31, August 7, and August 14, 2026. Lawyers should review the complete decision, statutes, rules, and record applicable to each matter.

Artificial intelligence is already part of legal work. The question for law firms is no longer whether someone in the firm will try it. The more useful question is whether the firm will use it deliberately, securely, and in ways that improve client service.

The answer is not to hand legal judgment to a machine. It is to identify the work that consumes professional time without requiring a professional to start from a blank page every time: organizing information, locating issues, comparing documents, building chronologies, identifying patterns, and producing a first-pass draft for lawyer review.

That distinction matters. The goal is not to replace lawyers. The goal is to give lawyers and staff more time for the work clients actually need from them: judgment, strategy, counseling, advocacy, negotiation, and accountability.

Start with the work—not the technology

A common mistake is to begin with a general instruction to “use AI.” That produces scattered experimentation and inconsistent results.

A better starting point is a workflow question:

What recurring task is slowing the team down, delaying the client, or consuming time that could be spent on higher-value legal work?

The best early use cases usually have three characteristics:

• They recur often. The firm encounters the same task across many matters.

• They involve a large volume of information. Someone must read, sort, compare, or summarize material before legal analysis can begin.

• They remain subject to human review. The output can help a lawyer or trained staff member work faster, but it does not become the final answer without verification.

This framework shifts the conversation from “What can this tool do?” to “What bottleneck can we responsibly improve?”

Where AI can add practical value

Organizing facts and documents

Legal teams routinely receive information in forms that are hard to use: long emails, scanned records, police reports, discovery productions, financial statements, medical records, contract versions, and client-uploaded documents.

AI can help create a first-pass summary, chronology, issue list, or document inventory. That does not eliminate the need to read key records. It gives the reviewer a structured starting point and helps identify what deserves closer attention.

Examples include:

• building a chronology from pleadings, correspondence, records, and reports;

• identifying dates, people, documents, and events that recur across a production;

• summarizing a deposition or hearing transcript for attorney review; and

• preparing a document checklist that identifies missing or inconsistent information.

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Research preparation and source organization

AI can help lawyers formulate research questions, identify potentially relevant authorities, summarize long opinions, and organize a first-pass discussion of competing arguments.

The lawyer remains responsible for verifying the authority, checking that a case remains good law, reading the opinion in context, and deciding whether the authority supports the position being advanced. AI can accelerate the path to those tasks; it cannot replace them.

Drafting from a verified factual record

Once facts, objectives, and governing law are confirmed, AI can assist with first drafts of routine communications, internal summaries, issue lists, document requests, outlines, and other work product.

The safe and useful model is not “generate and send.” It is generate, review, revise, and approve. A lawyer or appropriately supervised professional must confirm that the draft reflects the actual record, client instructions, applicable law, tone, and strategic purpose.

Comparing and reviewing documents

Many transactional and litigation tasks begin with comparison: what changed between two versions, what terms appear in each agreement, which provision is missing, or where a document conflicts with another record.

AI can rapidly surface differences and recurring provisions. That can reduce the time spent locating the issue, allowing the lawyer to focus on the harder question: whether the difference matters, what risk it creates, and what should happen next.

Where AI does not belong alone

AI is not a lawyer, a client representative, or the person accountable for the matter. There are tasks that cannot be delegated to an automated system.

Legal judgment and client advice

An AI system cannot decide what a client should do. It cannot assess the client’s risk tolerance, business priorities, family circumstances, credibility, litigation posture, or goals. Those decisions require a lawyer’s judgment and a real attorney-client relationship.

Final verification of facts and authorities

AI output may omit a fact, misunderstand a document, use an outdated authority, or state a proposition too broadly. Every material fact, citation, quotation, calculation, and legal proposition requires human verification before it is relied upon or sent outside the firm.

Strategic decisions

Whether to file a motion, accept an offer, initiate settlement discussions, take a deposition, advise a client to testify, or pursue a particular claim is not an automation problem. AI may help organize information relevant to the decision, but the decision belongs to the lawyer and client.

Client communication without review

Clients should not receive unreviewed AI-generated legal advice, case updates, or draft documents. A fast response is valuable only if it is accurate, understandable, appropriately tailored, and consistent with the client’s objectives.

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The human-review rule

The most useful internal rule is also the simplest:

No AI output becomes client work product until a qualified human reviews it.

That rule should apply whether the output is a summary, research result, chronology, contract comparison, draft letter, internal memorandum, or client-facing communication.

Human review is not a ceremonial final glance. It should be matched to the risk of the task. A routine internal document list may require a different level of review than a court filing, legal memorandum, settlement communication, or advice that could affect a client’s liberty, livelihood, family, or business.

The reviewer should be able to answer:

• What source material supports this statement?

• Is the output complete enough for its purpose?

• Does it reflect current law and the actual facts of the matter?

• Does it reveal confidential information or create a misleading impression?

• Is this the advice, analysis, or communication the client should receive?

Choosing the first use case

Firms do not need to transform every workflow at once. In fact, they should not. A controlled first use case is better than a broad, unmeasured rollout.

A good first project might be:

• first-pass summaries of incoming client documents;

• chronologies from records or productions;

• comparison of contract versions;

• internal research outlines that link to verified authorities;

• checklists for recurring intake or closing tasks; or

• internal drafts of routine correspondence for lawyer review.

A poor first project is one where the firm cannot describe the expected result, identify a reviewer, define approved information sources, or measure whether the new process improved anything.

A five-question test

Before adopting AI for a workflow, ask:

• Is the task repetitive? Repetition makes it easier to define a useful, reliable process.

• Is the source material available and appropriate for the approved tool? The firm must understand what information will be used and how it will be protected.

• Can a human verify the output efficiently? If verification takes as long as doing the work from scratch, the use case may not be ready.

• Is the output a starting point rather than an unreviewed final answer? The firm should retain lawyer judgment and accountability.

• Can the firm measure the result? Track turnaround time, completeness, error correction, client response, and user feedback.

The ethical question is not whether to use AI

The ethical question is whether the firm is using technology competently and responsibly.

That means understanding the tool well enough to recognize its benefits and limitations; protecting client information; supervising the work product; checking sources and facts; and ensuring that a lawyer remains accountable for legal services.

Firms should resist two unhelpful instincts. The first is to prohibit all AI use and assume the issue will disappear. The second is to allow uncontrolled use and assume the technology will police itself. Neither approach creates a durable professional workflow.

A responsible firm starts small, uses approved tools, establishes review expectations, and learns from the results. The next post in this series will address how to turn that first controlled use case into a structured 90-day pilot.

Bottom line

AI is most useful when it helps a legal team move from unstructured information to an organized starting point. It can make document-heavy work faster, help lawyers find issues sooner, and create capacity for better client communication and more deliberate legal judgment.

But AI does not relieve a firm of its professional duties. The lawyer remains responsible for the facts, law, strategy, advice, and final work product.

The right first step is not to ask AI to run the practice. It is to identify one recurring task where AI can assist a trained professional, build a review process around it, and measure whether the client and the firm are actually better served.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Firms should evaluate their own professional obligations, client-information practices, approved technology, and supervision procedures before implementing an AI-assisted workflow.

From July 31 through August 14, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals issued a steady stream of criminal-case entries. But the docket did not yield a published merits opinion creating a new rule for practitioners to cite.

Instead, the Court’s releases fell into two categories:

• rehearing denials in appeals previously decided; and

• affirmances by memorandum in new appeals.

That can look like a quiet period in criminal law. It is not. It is a useful reminder that appellate monitoring has two jobs: identify new precedent when the Court announces it, and identify case-status signals when the Court does not.

The distinction matters for lawyers handling individual appeals, lawyers monitoring recurring issues, and firms deciding what belongs in a public case-law update.

The three-week pattern

July 31: six rehearing denials

On July 31, the Court overruled rehearing applications in Etherton v. City of Rainsville, Martin v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, P.A. v. State, Culver v. State, Floyd v. State, and George v. State.

August 7: five rehearing denials

The August 7 docket likewise consisted of rehearing denials in Johnson v. State, Miles v. State, Boone v. State, Perez v. State, and Mitchell v. State.

August 14: new memorandum affirmances, plus rehearing activity

The August 14 docket included memorandum affirmances in Hawkins v. Alabama Department of Corrections and Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, Burlison v. City of Boaz, Tinsley v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, and Funderburg v. Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles. The Court also overruled rehearing in Harris v. City of Gulf Shores, State v. Scott, Brunson v. State, and Parker v. State.

The publicly available entries do not disclose the underlying offenses, facts, or legal reasoning in the memorandum cases. Accordingly, this post does not infer substantive holdings from captions or docket labels.

What a memorandum affirmance means—and does not mean

Under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 54, the Court of Criminal Appeals may affirm without a published opinion when an opinion would serve no significant precedential purpose. The Court still prepares a memorandum addressing the appellant’s contentions and the reasons for rejecting them, but the memorandum is not published in the official reports. A no-opinion affirmance or memorandum has no precedential value and generally may not be cited in briefs or arguments, subject to narrow exceptions for such matters as law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, or procedural bar. Ala. R. App. P. 54.

For the broader criminal-defense bar, that means a memorandum affirmance is not a new authority to add to a motion, brief, or CLE outline. It does not show that the Court has announced a new rule on suppression, sentencing, jury selection, confrontation, or postconviction procedure.

For counsel in the case, however, the memorandum is essential. It explains the result that must be evaluated on rehearing, in a possible certiorari petition, or in deciding what the judgment means for the client.

A better way to read a weekly appellate docket

A weekly docket should not be sorted into only two categories: “important” and “unimportant.” The more useful question is what the entry requires the lawyer to do.

Docket event

What it means for the broader bar

What it means for counsel in the case

Published merits opinion

Potential new precedent; read, analyze, and assess whether it changes practice.

Evaluate the holding, remedy, rehearing options, and any next appellate step.

Memorandum affirmance

No new citable doctrine; monitor for issue trends but do not treat it as authority.

Obtain and analyze the memorandum, preserve issues, and advise the client on next steps.

Rehearing denied

Usually no new doctrine or rationale.

Evaluate discretionary review, finality, and case-specific consequences immediately.

Certificate of judgment

A finality signal, not a merits ruling.

Confirm the effect of finality in the case and assess any remaining remedies or deadlines.

This three-week run is an example of why a law firm should monitor more than published opinions. A docket full of memorandum affirmances and rehearing denials may not justify multiple public “case roundup” posts. But it does require disciplined internal monitoring, because clients do not experience a rehearing denial or certificate of judgment as a quiet week.

The defense-side lesson: memorandum cases still require a record strategy

The Court’s choice not to issue a published opinion does not mean the appeal lacked an issue worth preserving. It means the disposition does not serve as precedent for everyone else.

Counsel handling a memorandum affirmance should immediately obtain and review the memorandum, original briefs, record citations, rehearing materials, and the exact order issued by the Court. The questions are case-specific:

• What issue did the memorandum reject?

• Did the rehearing application identify the overlooked law or fact with sufficient particularity?

• If the memorandum omitted facts or stated them inadequately, did counsel include the statement of facts required for later review?

• Is there a genuine ground for Alabama Supreme Court certiorari, rather than simply a disagreement with the result?

• What is the client’s actual objective if further review is pursued?

In an ordinary criminal case, rehearing in the Court of Criminal Appeals is generally a prerequisite to certiorari review. Rule 40 also makes the rehearing application the place to present a fact statement when the court’s memorandum has none, or to propose additional or corrected facts when necessary. Ala. R. App. P. 40.

That is not a technicality. Under Rule 39, a certiorari petition may need to reproduce, verbatim and with record references, a fact statement that was presented on rehearing but not adopted by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Ala. R. App. P. 39.

Why these weeks produced no new appellate rule to analyze

For criminal practitioners, the key fact is not that the Court issued several entries. It is that none of those entries contains a new, published legal holding.

A rehearing-denied notice tells the reader only that the Court declined to change its earlier decision. A memorandum affirmance resolves the individual appeal, but Rule 54 prevents counsel from treating the memorandum as citable authority in the next case. Neither type of entry supports a reliable claim that the Court has changed Alabama law on suppression, sentencing, evidence, postconviction procedure, municipal appeals, parole, or any other recurring issue.

That is why these dockets do not yield a conventional case-law analysis. There is no written, precedential reasoning to parse, compare with earlier cases, or apply to a different client’s facts. The responsible conclusion is limited: these cases reached procedural or appellate endpoints, but the public docket does not disclose a new rule for the criminal-law bar.

What lawyers should take from the absence of a published holding

The absence of a new opinion does not mean the Court’s work was insignificant. It means the lessons are narrower and case-specific.

• For lawyers with cases on these dockets: obtain the memorandum, review the rehearing record, calendar finality, and assess whether a genuine basis exists for further review.

• For lawyers following Alabama criminal law generally: do not treat the captions, court names, or outcomes as evidence that the Court endorsed a proposition of law that can be used in another case.

• For lawyers watching recurring practice areas: note the categories of cases that appear—such as municipal matters, parole or corrections litigation, postconviction matters, and direct criminal appeals—but wait for a published opinion or an accessible underlying memorandum before drawing a doctrinal conclusion.

This distinction protects against a common appellate-monitoring error: treating a large docket as a large body of law. A docket may be busy while the precedential law remains unchanged.

Bottom line

The July 31, August 7, and August 14 dockets did not create a new body of published Alabama criminal law. But they demonstrate a core appellate reality: published precedent is only one part of the work.

For the broader bar, the absence of a published opinion means there is no new authority to cite. For counsel in the affected appeals, a memorandum affirmance or rehearing denial may be the most important development of the case.

The right practice is to track both: read published opinions for doctrine, and read individual docket events for deadlines, preservation, finality, and client advice.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It summarizes publicly available Court of Criminal Appeals entries issued July 31, August 7, and August 14, 2026. It does not purport to describe the undisclosed reasoning or merits of the underlying memorandum decisions.

Three children are dead. Any discussion of the Lindsay Clancy trial that begins anywhere else has already lost its moral footing.

That fact does not make the legal question easy. It makes it harder.

The public wants a clean story: either a mother was gravely ill and failed by the people charged with helping her, or she deliberately murdered her children and must be punished accordingly. Those stories are emotionally satisfying because they assign the horror to a single source. The trial does not permit that convenience.

The question for the jury is not whether postpartum illness is real. It is. It is not whether psychiatric suffering can be profound. It can. And it is not whether the deaths of three children demand grief, outrage, and an accounting. They do.

The legal question is narrower and more exacting: at the time of the killings, was Lindsay Clancy criminally responsible for what she did?

That distinction is not semantic. It is the entire case.

Recent testimony has focused on Clancy’s psychiatric treatment, medications, reported decline, family observations, and the information she searched for before the children’s deaths. AP’s trial coverage and its reporting on the search evidence make clear why the facts will be so difficult for any jury to process. AP’s report on pre-death searches

A Diagnosis Explains Nothing by Itself—and Excuses Nothing by Itself

There is a temptation, particularly online, to treat a diagnosis as a verdict. It is not.

A psychiatric diagnosis may be indispensable evidence. It may help a jury understand perceptions, beliefs, impulses, judgment, cognition, or the collapse of ordinary functioning. It may help explain conduct that otherwise appears unimaginable. But diagnosis is not a magic word. The law does not ask whether a defendant had a diagnosis, took medication, suffered from depression, or was in crisis. It asks what the illness did to the defendant’s legally relevant capacities at the time of the act.

That is not a cold or technical distinction. It is the safeguard that prevents criminal responsibility from being decided by labels, headlines, or our personal reaction to a tragedy.

The converse is equally important. The fact that a defendant’s actions are horrific does not answer the criminal-responsibility question either. Horror is not proof of a legally sound mental state. A jury may conclude that a person did something dreadful and still confront credible evidence that severe mental illness impaired the very capacities the law requires for criminal blame.

Those are not contradictory propositions. They are the difficult work of a criminal justice system that claims to distinguish what happened from what a person was capable of understanding or controlling when it happened.

No one should confuse that inquiry with indifference toward the victims. The children are not a footnote to a debate about psychiatric terminology. They are the reason the question of responsibility matters so much.

The Evidence Will Not Arrive Neatly Sorted

The prosecution’s theory, as publicly reported, is that the killings were intentional and premeditated. The defense position is that Clancy’s postpartum psychiatric condition left her not criminally responsible. AP’s overview of the trial

Both sides will point to facts that the public will be tempted to treat as conclusive. They are not.

A search history can look like planning. It can also be evidence of terror, suicidal thinking, a desperate search for an explanation, or a person trying to understand an unraveling mind. A medication record can look like evidence that someone was receiving care. It can also raise questions about whether care was adequate, whether symptoms were recognized, and whether treatment itself was changing. Family testimony can establish warning signs. It can also reveal the terrible limits of what loved ones can see, understand, or stop.

None of that means all interpretations are equally persuasive. It means a criminal case cannot be responsibly decided by selecting one fact, attaching a preferred story to it, and calling the work finished.

“Not Criminally Responsible” Does Not Mean “Nothing Happens”

Public conversation about mental-responsibility defenses often collapses into a familiar accusation: the defendant is “getting away with it.” That phrase is usually more rhetorical than accurate.

A finding that a defendant is not criminally responsible is not a declaration that nothing happened, that no one suffered, or that the defendant is simply sent home. Reporting on this case notes that a lack-of-criminal-responsibility verdict would result in commitment to a state mental-health facility rather than an unqualified release. AP’s August 18 report

That result may not satisfy every person’s sense of retribution. It is not designed to. Criminal punishment rests on culpability. If a person’s mental condition negated the legal capacity necessary for culpability, the state is not being soft by recognizing that limit; it is applying the premise that punishment is for the blameworthy, not merely for the tragic.

That premise should not be controversial. It is one of the few restraints that keeps criminal law from becoming a mechanism for converting every catastrophe into vengeance.

The Medical-System Questions Are Real—But They Are Not the Jury’s Only Job

The Clancy case rightly raises broader questions about postpartum psychiatric care: whether warning signs were recognized, whether treatment and monitoring were adequate, whether medications were appropriately managed, and whether families are given meaningful guidance when a loved one is deteriorating.

Those questions matter. They may have consequences in civil litigation, professional regulation, institutional reform, and ordinary family decision-making. Reporting indicates that the events also overlap with a malpractice lawsuit concerning the care Clancy received. AP’s report on psychiatric-care testimony

But it is a mistake to make the criminal jury carry the full weight of those failures—or to pretend that proof of a system failure automatically resolves individual criminal responsibility. A jury must decide the case under the legal standard it is given, based on the evidence it hears. It cannot rewrite mental-health care. It cannot punish clinicians who are not on trial. It cannot use a murder verdict to express anger at a health-care system, however warranted that anger may be.

The public, however, has a wider obligation. It should be asking why families in crisis so often have to recognize psychiatric emergency without a clear pathway to immediate, coordinated, competent help.

We Can Hold More Than One Truth at a Time

The urge to choose one moral frame is understandable. It is also inadequate.

We can say, without qualification, that three children deserved to live and that their deaths are devastating. We can say that a parent’s severe mental illness, if proved, should be taken with the utmost seriousness. We can demand rigorous accountability from every institution that may have missed danger. And we can insist that a criminal verdict be based on the law of responsibility—not on slogans about mothers, mental illness, punishment, or sympathy.

That is not pulling punches. It is refusing to use the dead children as props in a culture-war argument, or to use a severely ill defendant as a symbol in a debate that has little patience for legal precision.

The Clancy trial is not a referendum on whether postpartum illness is real. It is not a referendum on whether the medical system fails women. It is not a referendum on whether grief should produce punishment.

It is a criminal trial. Its question is brutal and specific: whether the prosecution has established criminal responsibility in the face of evidence that the defense says shows a profound psychiatric break.

A just result requires the jury to take the children’s deaths with full seriousness. It also requires the jury to take the legal meaning of mental illness with full seriousness.

Anything less is not justice. It is performance.

This essay addresses public reporting and general principles of criminal responsibility. It does not express a view on what the jury should decide, and it does not replace the governing jury instructions or the trial record.

A residuary clause can look straightforward when it names a group of relatives and says they take “equally.” But the result can change dramatically when one or more of those beneficiaries dies before the testator.

That is the central lesson of Johnson v. Mayers, SC-2025-0297 (Ala. June 27, 2025). The Alabama Supreme Court held that Alabama’s antilapse statute did not apply where the will used survivorship language and provided an alternative disposition if none of the named beneficiaries survived the testator. Because only one named beneficiary survived, that beneficiary received the entire residuary estate.

For estate planners, the case is a reminder that the words used to address a beneficiary’s death are not boilerplate. They decide whether a deceased beneficiary’s descendants take by substitution, whether surviving named beneficiaries take a larger share, or whether the property passes to a different contingent class.

The dispute in Johnson

The will first left the estate to the testator’s father. If the father did not survive, the will directed that the residuary estate pass equally to four named siblings. It then provided that, if none of those persons survived the testator, the estate would pass to the testator’s nearest living heirs.

By the time the testator died, only one of the four named siblings was alive. The children of two deceased siblings argued that Alabama’s antilapse statute should allow them to take their parents’ shares by representation.

The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court held that the will’s survivorship language and its alternative gift showed a contrary testamentary intent sufficient to prevent application of the statutory default. The sole surviving named beneficiary therefore took the entire residue.

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What Alabama’s antilapse statute does

Alabama’s antilapse statute, Ala. Code § 43-8-224, is a default rule. In qualifying circumstances, it can preserve a devise for the issue of a deceased beneficiary who was a grandparent or lineal descendant of a grandparent of the testator.

The rule exists because a will may name a close relative who later dies before the testator. Without a substitute disposition, a strict lapse rule can produce a result the testator may not have intended.

But the statute does not override a clearly expressed contrary intent. Alabama law gives controlling effect to the testator’s intent as expressed in the will, and construction rules such as the antilapse statute apply unless the instrument indicates otherwise.

Why survivorship language mattered

In Johnson, the Court treated the will’s requirement that the named beneficiaries survive the testator as evidence that the gift was limited to the named beneficiaries still living at death. The will also addressed the contingency that none of those named beneficiaries survived, directing the residue to the testator’s heirs.

Those two features worked together:

• Survivorship language indicated that only named beneficiaries who outlived the testator would take; and

• An alternative gift answered the next question—what happens if all of the named beneficiaries are gone.

The result was not a partial share for each deceased beneficiary’s descendants. Instead, the one surviving named beneficiary received the full residue.

“Equally” does not answer every survivorship question

Estate planners often use language such as “to my children equally,” “to my siblings in equal shares,” or “share and share alike.” That language identifies the intended division among the relevant beneficiaries, but it may not answer what happens when one of them predeceases the testator.

The answer depends on the entire clause, including:

• whether the beneficiaries are named individually or described as a class;

• whether the will requires survival;

• whether it names substitute beneficiaries;

• whether the instrument directs distribution by representation, per stirpes, or per capita; and

• whether it contains a gift-over if one, some, or all beneficiaries fail to survive.

A drafter should not assume that “equally” alone carries the client’s intended result through every possible death sequence.

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Three questions for every residuary clause

1. Who takes if one named beneficiary dies before the testator?

The client may intend for that beneficiary’s children to take the share, for the surviving named beneficiaries to divide it, or for a separate contingent beneficiary to receive it. Those are different plans and should be stated directly.

2. Does the client want descendants to take by substitution?

If the client wants a deceased beneficiary’s descendants to step into that beneficiary’s place, the will should say so clearly. If the client does not want substitution, survivorship language and an expressly stated alternative plan should be reviewed for consistency with that objective.

3. What happens if no primary beneficiary survives?

A complete residuary clause should address the failure of the entire primary class. The alternative gift should be coordinated with the client’s intended heirs, charitable beneficiaries, trust plan, or other ultimate recipients.

A drafting review checklist

Before finalizing a will that names multiple relatives in a residuary clause, test the clause against common scenarios.

ScenarioQuestion to answerOne named beneficiary dies before the testatorDoes that beneficiary’s share pass to descendants, surviving named beneficiaries, or a different contingent beneficiary?A beneficiary dies leaving children from a prior relationshipDoes the instrument clearly include or exclude those descendants?Only one named beneficiary survivesShould that person receive the entire residue, or should deceased beneficiaries’ descendants share?No named beneficiary survivesWho takes next, and is that group identified precisely enough?A beneficiary disclaims or is treated as having predeceasedDoes the clause address that possibility consistently with the client’s intended distribution?A beneficiary is a minor or has special needsShould the gift pass outright, to a trust, or under another protective arrangement?

The client should be able to hear each scenario in plain language and confirm the intended result. That conversation often reveals a gap that a general “equally” provision does not solve.

Practice points for estate planners

Use the client’s distribution objective, not inherited form language

A prior will form may say that gifts pass “to my surviving children” or “to my siblings who survive me.” Those words may be entirely appropriate, but they should not remain simply because they appeared in an earlier document. Ask whether the client wants a bloodline or family-branch result, a survivor-take-all result, or a different contingent plan.

Coordinate specific gifts and the residue

A will may have detailed survival language in a specific devise but vague language in the residuary clause—or the reverse. Review the instrument as a whole to make sure its survival requirements, substitute gifts, and residual plan do not pull in different directions.

Avoid relying on the statutory default as the estate plan

The antilapse statute can supply a rule when the will is silent, but the default may not match the client’s intent. A will should state the intended succession plan rather than leave a family’s distribution to statutory construction after a death occurs.

Revisit old wills after major family changes

The operative will in Johnson had been executed decades before the testator died. A periodic review after a beneficiary’s death, divorce, birth of grandchildren, blended-family change, or substantial asset change can prevent the residue from passing under language the client no longer understands or would not choose today.

Administration lesson: resolve dispositive construction issues early

Johnson also contains an important procedural point. During the estate administration, the administratrix sought a declaratory judgment construing the will and determining whether the antilapse statute applied. The Supreme Court held that the declaratory judgment was final and appealable because it resolved all issues presented in that construction petition, even though the overall estate administration had not yet reached final settlement.

For personal representatives and probate litigators, that provides a practical roadmap. When a construction issue determines who is entitled to the residue, resolving it early can prevent distributions based on an incorrect reading of the will and can give the estate a clear path toward final settlement.

The decision does not mean every interim probate ruling is immediately appealable. It means that a declaratory judgment that conclusively resolves the claims raised in a will-construction petition can be final for appellate purposes even while other estate-administration work continues.

Bottom line

Johnson v. Mayers reinforces a familiar but important proposition: the testator’s expressed intent controls. Alabama’s antilapse statute is a valuable default rule, but it gives way when a will clearly requires survivorship and supplies a contrary contingency plan.

For drafters, the lesson is to make the survivorship sequence explicit. For administrators, it is to identify and resolve construction questions before distributing an estate. And for clients, it is a reminder that a few words in the residuary clause can determine whether descendants inherit—or whether one surviving named beneficiary receives everything.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It discusses Alabama law and the particular will language considered in Johnson v. Mayers. The outcome in an individual estate depends on the governing instrument, family relationships, relevant facts, and applicable law.

A memorandum affirmance followed by a one-line rehearing denial creates a familiar appellate problem: the client wants to know what happened next, but the court has provided no new analysis and the deadline for Alabama Supreme Court review is already running.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ July 24, 2026 orders in Mann v. State, Smith v. State, and Ramirez v. State provide a useful prompt for a broader question: what should criminal appellate counsel do in the 14 days after rehearing is denied?

This is not a recap of the July 24 cases. The public entries disclose only that rehearing was overruled after June 18 memorandum affirmances. They do not reveal the offenses, facts, claims, or reasons for the underlying decisions. Instead, the docket illustrates a repeatable post-rehearing workflow for counsel handling any memorandum affirmance in the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.

The first mistake: treating the rehearing denial as a second merits opinion

A notice overruling rehearing does not explain why the court rejected the application. It does not expand the court’s reasoning, create a new rule, or turn the earlier memorandum into citable authority.

Under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 54, a no-opinion affirmance or memorandum issued by the Court of Criminal Appeals has no precedential value and generally may not be cited in briefs or arguments, except for specified preclusion-related purposes. Ala. R. App. P. 54.

The question after rehearing is therefore not, “What new doctrine did the court announce?” It is, “What record did we preserve, what result became final, and is there a disciplined basis for discretionary review?”

The first 48 hours: conduct a file audit

Before deciding whether to seek certiorari, appellate counsel should assemble the materials that matter to the next decision:

• the Court of Criminal Appeals’ underlying opinion or memorandum;

• the original briefs and record citations supporting the issue;

• the rehearing application and supporting brief;

• any response to rehearing;

• the rehearing-overruled notice or order;

• the relevant clerk’s record and reporter’s transcript excerpts; and

• the client’s current objective and the scope of representation.

This is not paperwork for paperwork’s sake. A certiorari petition is not a second opening brief. It requires counsel to identify a limited, review-worthy question and present it through the factual and procedural record that has already been built.

Audit the facts before you audit the law

A memorandum disposition creates a particular risk: the Alabama Supreme Court ordinarily limits its review to the facts stated in the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion or memorandum unless the petitioner uses the procedure in Rule 39(d)(5).

That makes the rehearing application critical. In a criminal case, if the memorandum contains no statement of facts, the rehearing applicant must include a statement of facts. If the memorandum states facts inaccurately or incompletely, the applicant may present an additional or corrected statement. Ala. R. App. P. 40.

For a later certiorari petition, any additional, corrected, or independent fact statement presented on rehearing must be reproduced verbatim, with record references and verification, if the Court of Criminal Appeals did not incorporate it into a later opinion or memorandum. Ala. R. App. P. 39.

The practical consequence is stark: if the key factual context was not put before the Court of Criminal Appeals on rehearing, it may be difficult to place it before the Alabama Supreme Court at the petition stage.

The 14-day question: is there a certiorari case, not merely a losing appeal?

A petition for writ of certiorari from a Court of Criminal Appeals decision is generally due within 14 days after the rehearing ruling. The petition must identify a ground recognized by Rule 39; certiorari is discretionary, not a second direct appeal. Ala. R. App. P. 39.

The initial screening question should be whether the case fits a certiorari ground—not whether counsel can restate every argument from the Court of Criminal Appeals.

| Screening question                                                                                                | Why it matters                                                                                                                                       |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Is there a genuine conflict with controlling authority?                                                           | A conflict theory must be specific and explain why the lower-court result cannot be reconciled with prior authority.                                 |
| Is there a material question of first impression for the Alabama Supreme Court?                                   | The issue must be important enough to justify discretionary review, not merely new to the individual case.                                           |
| Did the decision initially construe or affect a qualifying constitutional, statutory, or public-officer question? | Rule 39 identifies limited categories that may support review.                                                                                       |
| Is a controlling Alabama Supreme Court precedent directly implicated?                                             | Rule 39 allows a petitioner to seek reconsideration of controlling Supreme Court authority, but that request must be direct and candid.              |
| Does the case have a client-centered reason for further review?                                                   | Counsel should assess the practical consequence of the issue: conviction, sentence, retrial exposure, collateral effects, or postconviction posture. |

A memorandum affirmance does not eliminate a possible conflict argument. Rule 39 accounts for the circumstance in which no opinion was issued or no language in an opinion clearly exposes the conflict. But the petitioner must then explain with particularity how the decision conflicts with prior authority.

Do not separate the merits question from the remedy question

Before recommending further review, counsel should identify what success would actually accomplish.

For one client, the issue may affect the validity of a conviction. For another, it may concern sentence structure, jail credit, restitution, probation conditions, or the procedural ability to seek later relief. The same legal issue can have different value depending on the available remedy and the client’s priorities.

The client conversation after rehearing should therefore include more than the appellate deadline. It should address:

• what the underlying memorandum left in place;

• what a successful certiorari petition could realistically change;

• the cost and scope of additional representation;

• any practical consequences of waiting for finality; and

• any other deadlines that must be assessed in the individual case.

Calendar two dates, not one

The certiorari deadline is not the same as the certificate-of-judgment date.

Rule 41 provides that the Court of Criminal Appeals’ certificate of judgment ordinarily issues 18 days after an order denying rehearing, unless the time is changed by order. A timely certiorari petition stays issuance of the certificate until the Alabama Supreme Court finally disposes of the petition. Ala. R. App. P. 41.

Counsel should immediately calendar:

• the 14-day certiorari deadline; and

• the expected certificate-of-judgment date if no timely petition is filed.

Those dates perform different functions. Missing the first may end the opportunity for Supreme Court review. Ignoring the second can lead to avoidable confusion about when the intermediate appellate judgment becomes final.

The July 24 examples

The July 24 docket offers three illustrations of this workflow. In Mann, Smith, and Ramirez, the Court of Criminal Appeals had affirmed by memorandum on June 18 and then overruled rehearing on July 24.

The public entries do not permit substantive commentary on the individual appeals. But they show why counsel needs a routine post-rehearing process: retrieve the memorandum, inspect the rehearing record, test the case against Rule 39, calendar finality, and advise the client before the short window closes.

Bottom line

A rehearing denial is not simply the last line of an appeal. It is a decision point.

The strongest post-rehearing practice is not reflexively filing a certiorari petition and not reflexively closing the file. It is a fast, disciplined review of the factual record, the available Rule 39 ground, the actual remedy, and the client’s objective.

The July 24 orders in Mann, Smith, and Ramirez are reminders of that process—not new precedent. When an appellate court provides no new reasoning, counsel’s job is to identify whether the record already contains the right case for further review.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It uses the publicly available July 24, 2026 Court of Criminal Appeals rehearing orders as examples of post-rehearing procedure. It does not purport to describe the undisclosed merits or reasoning in the underlying memorandum decisions.

Reports say that Daniels sent LSU a cease-and-desist letter objecting to the school’s continued use of his NIL after LSU assigned No. 5, the number Daniels wore during his Heisman-winning season, to another player. The available reporting describes a pre-suit letter rather than a public lawsuit, and the full letter does not appear to have been publicly released. That distinction matters: the public discussion has tended to collapse two separate questions into one.

The first is whether LSU may continue to make commercial use of Jayden Daniels’s identifiable NIL. The second is whether Daniels can prevent LSU from reissuing No. 5. Those are not the same legal claim—and the second is substantially more difficult on the reported facts.

NIL protects identity, not every symbol associated with an athlete

NIL is often used as shorthand for an athlete’s commercial identity: name, photograph, voice, signature, likeness, social-media persona, and other features that identify the athlete to consumers. The NCAA’s modern NIL framework recognizes that student-athletes may participate in legitimate commercial opportunities, while LSU’s NIL guidance separately requires written permission to use LSU’s own marks, logos, copyrights, or facilities. In other words, athlete rights and school IP rights can coexist in the same campaign.

A player’s jersey number may help identify that player, but it is not automatically the player’s property. A number becomes legally significant when it functions with other facts as part of a recognizable commercial identity—or when it has been protected through a specific contract, trademark registration, licensing arrangement, or brand campaign.

That is why the better question is not, “Who owns No. 5?” It is: What is LSU using, in what commercial context, and what rights did the parties allocate by contract?

The number alone is unlikely to decide the dispute

Athletic numbers can be protected as trademarks in the right circumstances, but trademark protection does not arise merely because a number is famous or emotionally connected to a player. The owner must establish protectable rights in a mark and, generally, a likelihood that consumers will be confused about source, sponsorship, affiliation, or approval.

The sports-world dispute in PBTM LLC v. Football Northwest, LLC illustrates the point. That litigation involved competing claims related to “12” branding connected to Seahawks fandom. The court’s analysis focused on actual trademark rights, contractual allocations, and likelihood of consumer confusion—not a generalized right to control a number. PBTM LLC v. Football Nw., LLC, No. C19-2081-RSL (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2022).

Applied here, LSU’s assignment of No. 5 to a current player, without more, is unlikely by itself to establish that LSU is commercially exploiting Daniels’s identity or misleading consumers into believing Daniels endorsed the new player. Reissuing a uniform number is ordinarily part of a team’s management of its own roster, uniforms, and traditions.

That conclusion could change if the surrounding presentation does the identifying work. For example, a campaign that pairs No. 5 with Daniels’s name, image, Heisman-era highlights, signature phrases, or an explicit suggestion that he approved the promotion presents a different analysis from placing No. 5 on a current athlete’s jersey.

The potentially stronger issue: continued commercial use of Daniels’s NIL

The reported letter’s legal force may lie less in the number itself and more in the allegation that LSU continues to use Daniels’s NIL after the relevant authorization ended. That claim would be fact-specific. Critical documents would include:

• any NIL, media, merchandising, licensing, or appearance agreement involving Daniels, LSU, its athletic department, a conference, a collective, or a licensing agent;

• the agreement’s scope, duration, termination rights, and post-term use provisions;

• releases governing game footage, photography, archival content, social media, and merchandise;

• the particular advertisements, products, videos, or promotions challenged; and

• evidence of whether the use implies Daniels’s current endorsement or affiliation.

Contract often does more work than headline-level NIL terminology. If an agreement granted LSU a perpetual or continuing right to use certain historical images and footage, a demand to stop that use may be limited by the agreement’s language. If the authorization was narrow, expired, or excluded commercial merchandising, Daniels’s position becomes stronger.

The broader NIL litigation history shows why identifiability matters. In the college-football video-game litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that a right-of-publicity claim could proceed where a game allegedly recreated a former player with a matching combination of physical characteristics, playing attributes, team context, and jersey number—even though names were omitted. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation v. Electronic Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). The legal takeaway is not that any jersey number belongs to an athlete; it is that a sufficiently realistic combination of details can identify an athlete for commercial purposes.

Louisiana adds an important wrinkle

Because LSU is located in Louisiana, state-law publicity claims deserve particular attention. Louisiana does recognize privacy interests that can include appropriation of a living person’s name or likeness, but its appellate courts have been cautious about creating a broad, freestanding right of publicity without legislative direction.

In Frigon v. Universal Pictures, Inc., the Louisiana First Circuit declined to recognize the asserted post-mortem right-of-publicity claim as a new cause of action absent legislative action. Frigon v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 255 So. 3d 591 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2018). That case did not involve a living athlete’s current NIL dispute, and it does not answer Daniels’s potential claims. But it does underscore why an athlete in Louisiana should not assume that a broad “right of publicity” label resolves the issue. Contract, trademark, false-endorsement theory, privacy/appropriation principles, and the governing law clause may be decisive.

Schools and athletes should separate the rights at the outset

This dispute is a practical drafting lesson for athletic departments, collectives, licensees, and athletes. Their agreements should state, in plain terms:

• whether the school may use the athlete’s name, image, likeness, jersey number, signature, or social-media content;

• whether the use is limited to recruiting, news, archival content, fundraising, ticketing, merchandising, or third-party licensing;

• whether the school may use historical content after the athlete leaves;

• whether a uniform number can be promoted as associated with the athlete after departure;

• whether the athlete has approval or notice rights for commercial campaigns; and

• who owns, controls, and enforces any trademarks developed around the athlete’s personal brand.

The school must also protect its side of the line. LSU’s published NIL guidance states that use of LSU trademarks, logos, copyrights, or facilities requires written permission. A player can commercialize personal identity rights without obtaining ownership of the institution’s uniforms, marks, or brand assets.

The bottom line

Jayden Daniels may have legitimate concerns if LSU is using his identifiable NIL in new commercial promotions outside the scope of any release or license. But the proposition that No. 5, standing alone, is legally “his NIL” is too broad.

A number can be part of a commercially recognizable identity. It can be protected in a tailored trademark or contract arrangement. And it can contribute to an actionable use when combined with enough identifying features to invoke a particular athlete. But a jersey number is not automatically an athlete-owned asset simply because fans connect it to that athlete.

For LSU, Daniels, and other college sports stakeholders, the practical issue is not sentimental ownership of a number. It is careful allocation of identity rights, institutional IP, commercial permissions, and post-term use before the athlete becomes a national brand.

This article addresses reported facts and general legal principles, not legal advice. The reported cease-and-desist letter has not been publicly filed as a lawsuit, and the full agreement history between Daniels and LSU is not public.

When someone you love is arrested or charged with a crime, the first days can feel chaotic. Families may be trying to arrange release, locate paperwork, answer calls, manage work and childcare, and understand what comes next—all while worrying about the person at the center of the case.

More than sixty years ago, the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court held that the right to counsel is fundamental to a fair criminal process and that states must provide counsel to indigent defendants charged with felony offenses.

That right matters because criminal cases move through procedures that are difficult to navigate alone. But appointing or retaining a lawyer is only the beginning. Families can often help defense counsel act quickly by gathering reliable information, preserving materials that may disappear, and avoiding actions that create new problems.

This checklist is a practical starting point for families. It is not a substitute for advice from counsel in the individual case.

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First: confirm who represents the client

Before sharing case information widely, confirm:

• the name of the attorney or public defender assigned to the case;

• the attorney’s office, telephone number, and preferred method for family contact;

• the next court date, if known; and

• whether the lawyer has permission from the client to communicate with a particular family member.

A lawyer’s primary duty is to the client. The attorney may be limited in what they can discuss with family members without the client’s permission, even when the family is paying for representation or providing essential support. That does not mean family information is unimportant. It means the lawyer must protect the client’s confidentiality and follow the client’s direction.

Gather the basic case information

Create one page with the information the family knows. Include:

• the client’s full legal name and date of birth;

• the jail or detention facility, booking number, and custody status, if applicable;

• arrest date, time, and location;

• arresting agency and any officer names or badge numbers shown on paperwork;

• case number, court, and charges listed on the citation, warrant, complaint, or bond paperwork;

• bond amount, conditions, and release information; and

• the date, time, and location of the next court appearance.

Use the paperwork itself when possible. Do not rely only on memory or social-media posts. If a document is missing, note that rather than guessing.

Preserve information that may not still exist later

Some of the most useful evidence in a criminal case is time-sensitive. Tell defense counsel promptly about possible sources of information, including:

• surveillance cameras near an arrest location, residence, business, parking lot, intersection, or venue;

• dash-camera, body-camera, doorbell-camera, or private-security video;

• 911 calls, dispatch information, photographs, text messages, call logs, or location data;

• witnesses who saw or heard relevant events;

• physical evidence, clothing, property, receipts, or documents; and

• medical treatment, injuries, or conditions that may be relevant to the events or to observed behavior.

Families should provide counsel with the location of potential evidence and the reason it may matter. They should not alter, delete, edit, post, or circulate the material. They also should not contact a represented opposing party, attempt to influence a witness, or ask anyone to change a version of events.

Prepare a reliable timeline

A simple timeline can be more useful than a long narrative. Start with the day before the event and continue through the arrest, booking, release, or first court date.

Include:

• where the client was and who was present;

• work, school, medical, travel, or family events that establish timing;

• contacts with law enforcement;

• any search, test, interview, or medical treatment; and

• names and contact information for people with firsthand knowledge.

Separate what someone personally saw or heard from what someone was told later. Label estimates as estimates. Counsel can investigate and compare the timeline with reports, video, dispatch logs, and other evidence.

Identify information that may affect release, sentencing, or case planning

Some information may not decide guilt or innocence, but it can still matter to release conditions, treatment planning, sentencing, or mitigation. Gather it carefully and share it with counsel:

• employment history, current job information, and work schedule;

• school enrollment, certifications, or training;

• stable housing and responsible family contacts;

• caregiving responsibilities for children, older relatives, or other dependents;

• military service, if applicable;

• medical, mental-health, or substance-use treatment information that the client wants counsel to consider;

• documentation of treatment, recovery, counseling, or support programs; and

• character references from people who can provide accurate, firsthand information.

Do not manufacture a “good character” packet or pressure anyone to write a letter. Accuracy and credibility matter more than volume.

Protect the client from avoidable communication problems

Families often want to explain the situation or defend the client publicly. That instinct is understandable, but public communication can complicate a defense.

Avoid public discussion of the facts

Do not post about the arrest, charges, alleged victim, witnesses, police officers, or evidence. Do not argue the case in comments, direct messages, neighborhood groups, or online fundraisers. A social-media post can be preserved, misunderstood, or used in ways the family did not expect.

Do not discuss the facts on recorded jail calls

Jail calls and messages may be monitored or recorded. The client should follow counsel’s guidance about communication. Families should avoid using calls or messages to collect a detailed factual account, relay information to third parties, or coordinate what anyone should say.

Do not contact witnesses about testimony

A family member may know a witness and believe a conversation would help. It may not. Contact with witnesses can create misunderstandings, accusations of pressure, or new evidentiary issues. Give the witness’s name and contact information to counsel instead.

Preserve, do not edit

If the family has relevant texts, photographs, video, messages, or documents, keep the original material. Do not crop, annotate, delete, forward broadly, or create a “cleaned-up” version. Note when and how the material was obtained, then provide it to counsel through the method counsel requests.

The family intake checklist

TaskWhat to collect or doWhy it helpsConfirm representationAttorney name, office contact information, next court date, and communication permissionsEnsures the family shares information through the right channel.Gather official paperworkCitation, warrant, bond papers, booking sheet, charging documents, and court noticesEstablishes the known charges, court, conditions, and deadlines.Create a timelineDates, times, locations, firsthand witnesses, and major eventsHelps counsel investigate and test the State’s narrative.Identify evidenceVideo locations, messages, photographs, dispatch information, records, and physical evidenceSome evidence may be overwritten or lost quickly.Identify witnessesNames, contact information, and what each person personally knowsAllows counsel to assess and contact witnesses appropriately.Gather stability and mitigation materialEmployment, housing, caregiving, school, treatment, and support informationMay assist with release, case planning, or sentencing advocacy.Protect communicationsKeep case facts off social media and out of recorded calls; do not contact witnesses about testimonyReduces the risk of avoidable damage to the defense.Follow conditionsReview bond terms, court dates, and no-contact or travel restrictionsHelps the client avoid new allegations or consequences.

What families should expect from the defense process

Counsel may need time to obtain discovery, review reports and recordings, investigate witnesses, research legal issues, file motions, negotiate, or prepare for a hearing or trial. The fact that a lawyer cannot provide an immediate final answer does not mean nothing is happening.

Families can help most by being organized, candid, and patient. Give counsel accurate information, identify time-sensitive evidence, follow instructions about communication, and tell counsel promptly if there is a new arrest, a change in contact information, a missed court date, a new witness, or a potential violation of release conditions.

What Gideon still means

Gideon recognized a basic truth: a person accused of a crime cannot be expected to navigate the criminal process alone simply because that person lacks money to hire an attorney. Counsel helps protect legal rights, evaluate the evidence, challenge the prosecution’s proof where appropriate, advise the client, and present the client’s position in court.

Families cannot take over that role. But they can help counsel do it well by preserving facts, gathering documents, identifying witnesses, supporting the client’s compliance with court conditions, and allowing the legal strategy to develop through the attorney-client relationship.

A final reminder

Every case is different. A family should not assume that information found online, advice from another case, or a generalized checklist determines what will happen in this one. The best next step is to give the client’s attorney accurate materials and ask how the family can support the defense without interfering with it.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It does not create an attorney-client relationship. A person facing criminal charges should seek advice from qualified counsel about the specific facts, charges, deadlines, and court procedures involved.

A DUI case is rarely won by filing every available motion. It is more often shaped by identifying the evidence that matters, finding the legal and factual pressure points early, and creating a record that allows the trial court to decide those issues—and an appellate court to review them if necessary.

For Alabama criminal-defense counsel, the most effective pretrial-motion strategy begins with an evidence map, not a boilerplate pleading. The central questions are practical:

• What did the officer actually observe before the stop, during the detention, and at arrest?

• What do the videos, dispatch records, reports, and test records show—and what do they omit?

• Is the prosecution relying on roadside observations, field-sobriety exercises, a breath result, a blood result, statements, or some combination of those categories?

• Which issues are candidates for exclusion or suppression, and which are better developed as factual challenges for cross-examination or trial?

A recent decision, McMillian v. State, CR-2023-0898 (Ala. Crim. App. June 27, 2025), illustrates the preservation point. The Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a challenge to blood-draw evidence where the defense did not file a pretrial suppression motion, did not make a sufficiently specific legal and factual challenge during trial, and did not object when related evidence was introduced. The lesson is not that blood evidence cannot be challenged. It is that the challenge must be timely and specific.

Start with an evidence map

Before deciding which motions to file, gather and organize the materials that support—or undermine—the State’s DUI theory. The review should include, as available:

• citation, arrest report, offense report, and supplemental reports;

• dispatch/CAD records and 911 audio;

• dash-camera, body-camera, booking-room, and station video;

• the full timeline from first observation through release, booking, or testing;

• field-sobriety documentation and any related training or administration records;

• breath-test tickets, instrument records, observation-period information, and maintenance or inspection material, when applicable;

• blood-draw warrant materials, return, affidavits, hospital records, collection documentation, laboratory materials, and chain-of-custody records, when applicable;

• witness statements, crash materials, photographs, and medical information relevant to observed impairment; and

• any client medical condition, injury, medication, disability, or environmental fact that bears on the officer’s observations or roadside exercises.

The evidence map should answer a basic but often neglected question: What is the State’s proof of impairment, and what proof is merely cumulative or vulnerable? A motion strategy is strongest when it targets evidence that changes the case, not simply evidence that exists.

Separate suppression questions from trial-proof questions

Not every problem with DUI evidence is a suppression issue. Counsel should separate the issues into two tracks.

Suppression or exclusion candidates

A motion may be appropriate when the defense can articulate a concrete legal and factual basis to challenge:

• the initial stop;

• the scope or length of a detention;

• the arrest;

• a search of the client, vehicle, or personal property;

• a warrant, affidavit, warrant scope, or warrant execution;

• a compelled blood draw;

• a statement or custodial interrogation; or

• a particular item of evidence that was obtained unlawfully.

The motion should identify the evidence to be suppressed, the specific legal basis, the material facts, and the requested relief. A broad statement that a search, seizure, or blood draw was “unreasonable” does not tell the trial court what factual dispute or legal defect it must decide.

Issues that may be stronger at trial

Other problems may not support suppression but can be central to reasonable doubt, cross-examination, or the weight of the evidence. Examples include:

• lighting, weather, terrain, traffic, footwear, injury, fatigue, or medical conditions affecting roadside performance;

• inconsistencies between video and the officer’s description of speech, balance, demeanor, or driving;

• the timing of observations versus the timing of a chemical test;

• the limits of retrograde extrapolation or other expert inferences;

• the distinction between the presence of a substance and actual impairment at the time of driving; and

• omissions, mistakes, or changes in the officer’s reports.

The point is not to avoid motions. It is to avoid trying to force every credibility or proof issue into a suppression framework that does not fit.

Build the motion plan around the State’s proof

1. Challenge the stop, detention, and arrest as distinct events

The initial basis for the stop may differ from the basis for continued detention, field-sobriety exercises, arrest, or chemical testing. Treating the entire roadside encounter as a single event can obscure the actual legal analysis.

A useful motion investigation asks:

• What specific fact did the officer rely on to initiate the stop or encounter?

• When did the initial mission of the stop end or change?

• What new facts did the officer claim justified additional questioning, testing, or detention?

• When did the officer contend probable cause existed for arrest?

• Does the video support the sequence and timing described in the reports?

Organizing the timeline this way may reveal that the strongest issue concerns the extension of the stop or the transition from a routine encounter to a custodial investigation—not necessarily the original traffic infraction.

2. Treat field-sobriety evidence as both a discovery and a trial-preparation issue

Field-sobriety evidence often carries persuasive force because it appears visual and immediate. That makes the underlying conditions and instructions important.

Counsel should compare the report to the video and investigate the details: the testing surface, lighting, weather, footwear, physical limitations, injuries, language barriers, distractions, officer instructions, and the client’s actual responses. Counsel should also identify whether the officer’s narrative of “clues” is visible on video or rests primarily on interpretation.

Some deficiencies may support a targeted evidentiary objection or motion, depending on the circumstances. Others will be more effectively addressed through cross-examination and a defense narrative that gives the fact-finder a reason to question the reliability of the officer’s conclusions.

3. Treat blood and breath evidence as separate litigation tracks

A chemical result is not a single piece of evidence. It is the endpoint of a sequence of decisions and procedures.

For a blood case, counsel should examine the legal authority for the draw, the warrant materials if a warrant was used, the scope and execution of the warrant, the collection setting, the identity and role of personnel involved, the timing of draws, the collection and labeling procedure, the chain of custody, laboratory documentation, and the prosecution’s theory connecting the result to the time of driving.

For a breath case, counsel should obtain and review the relevant testing documentation, timing records, observation information, instrument-generated records, and other material supporting the State’s foundation. The factual questions may include what occurred before the test, how the test was administered, what the records show, and whether the State can establish the required evidentiary foundation.

The motion decision should follow the evidence. If there is a concrete legal defect in how chemical evidence was obtained, a suppression motion may be necessary. If the concern goes to reliability, timing, interpretation, or foundation, counsel should determine whether the better vehicle is discovery, a motion in limine, an evidentiary objection, expert consultation, cross-examination, or some combination.

4. Do not overlook statements and video

DUI cases often include statements made roadside, in a patrol car, at a station, or in a medical setting. Review the entire recording, not just the excerpt identified by the report. Determine when the client was detained or arrested, what questions were asked, whether warnings were given where required, and whether the prosecution intends to use any statements for its case in chief or another purpose.

Video can create its own evidentiary issues. Confirm that the production is complete, identify gaps and unexplained start or stop points, preserve the original format where possible, and compare timestamps across video, dispatch logs, reports, and chemical-test records.

Preservation is part of the strategy

McMillian is a useful warning against waiting until trial to make an undeveloped objection. In that case, an oral assertion that a blood draw was “unreasonable” did not preserve a Fourth Amendment challenge where no specific basis was given and the defense did not object when the related evidence was later introduced.

The better practice is to make the court’s task clear:

• File early when the basis is known. A written motion identifies the exact evidence, grounds, disputed facts, and requested hearing.

• Create a record at the hearing. Offer the relevant exhibits, testimony, warrant materials, video, and argument needed for the court to decide the issue.

• Obtain a ruling. A clear ruling defines what remains contested and what needs to be protected at trial.

• Object when necessary. If the evidence is offered in a manner or on a ground not resolved by the pretrial ruling, make a timely and specific objection.

• Keep the theory consistent. The issue litigated in the trial court should match the issue counsel expects to assert later, subject to the evidence that develops at trial.

A hearing request alone is not enough. The motion must state the constitutional, statutory, procedural, or evidentiary theory with enough particularity to permit a meaningful ruling.

A pretrial DUI motion checklist

Use this checklist as a case-screening tool, not as a filing mandate.

CategoryQuestions to answer before deciding on a motionInitial encounterWhat was the factual basis for the stop or contact? Is it supported by video and dispatch material?DetentionWhen did the encounter extend beyond its original purpose, and what facts allegedly justified that extension?ArrestWhat facts support probable cause, and do the reports and video align?Field-sobriety evidenceWere the conditions, instructions, and observed “clues” reliably documented and visible?StatementsWhat was asked, when, and under what custodial circumstances?Breath evidenceWhat records establish timing, administration, and evidentiary foundation?Blood evidenceWhat legal authority supported the draw, and what do the warrant, collection, lab, and chain-of-custody records show?Video and dataIs the production complete? Do timestamps match the written reports and test records?Discovery gapsWhat information is missing, and what targeted request or court order is needed?Motion planIs the issue one of suppression, exclusion, evidentiary foundation, cross-examination, expert review, or trial proof?

The practical objective

A disciplined pretrial-motion strategy does more than seek exclusion. It forces the State’s evidence into a clear timeline, exposes factual gaps, preserves issues, and helps counsel decide early what kind of case it is.

In some matters, the best outcome will come from suppression. In others, the motion work will clarify that the central defense is reliability, timing, causation, or credibility. Either way, the work should begin before the jury is seated and before an improvised objection leaves the trial court without a developed issue to decide.

Bottom line

Alabama DUI defense is not a checklist exercise. The strongest pretrial motion practice starts with the evidence, identifies the actual legal and factual pressure point, and makes a timely, specific record.

The lesson from McMillian is practical: do not wait until the State is introducing the evidence to discover that the motion has no developed theory. Build the record early, preserve the issue precisely, and use motion practice to shape the case—not merely to react to it.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It discusses Alabama criminal-defense practice and the preservation lesson in McMillian v. State. Counsel should evaluate the facts, discovery, statutes, procedural rules, and current authority applicable to each case.

A criminal case can turn on what happens before the jury hears the challenged evidence—and before the court accepts the agreed sentence.

In McMillian v. State, CR-2023-0898 (Ala. Crim. App. June 27, 2025), the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals addressed both points. The Court rejected a challenge to blood-draw evidence because the defense did not make a timely, specific suppression argument. But it also reversed an illegal sentence imposed under a plea agreement for a Class D controlled-substance-possession conviction and required the trial court to allow the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea after resentencing.

The result is a useful reminder for Alabama criminal-defense counsel: preservation and sentencing review are separate, essential parts of case preparation. A vague objection may not secure review of a suppression issue. And an agreed sentence is not safe merely because every party accepts it; the court cannot impose a sentence that does not conform to the applicable law.

Track one: a suppression challenge needs timing and specificity

In the DUI case, the State introduced evidence from blood draws taken after the defendant was arrested and officers obtained a search warrant. The defense did not file a written pretrial suppression motion. During trial, after an officer described events at the hospital, defense counsel asserted that the blood seizure was “unreasonable” and asked for a suppression hearing.

The trial court asked for the legal basis. Trial Counsel did not identify a more particular legal or factual ground, and the court denied the request. The defense also did not object when the related video, toxicology testimony, and toxicology report were later offered.

The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the issue was not preserved. It emphasized two familiar, practical paths to preservation:

1. File a specific pretrial motion to suppress and obtain a ruling; or

2. Make a timely and specific objection when the evidence is offered at trial.

A general assertion that evidence was “unreasonable” was not enough. The Court also noted that blood evidence obtained under a search warrant carries a presumption of validity; a defendant challenging the seizure must identify the legal and factual basis for doing so.

What defense counsel should do before trial

A suppression motion should make the court’s task concrete. Depending on the facts, counsel should identify the precise claimed defect—for example:

• lack of a valid warrant or a defect in the warrant process;

• insufficient probable cause;

• an unlawful stop, detention, arrest, or search;

• an overbroad warrant or execution beyond the warrant’s scope;

• a failure to comply with a legally required procedure; or

• a specific constitutional or statutory basis for exclusion.

The motion should tie the legal theory to the known facts, request the necessary hearing, and identify the evidence the defense seeks to suppress. If the State introduces the challenged evidence at trial and the pretrial record does not clearly resolve admissibility, counsel should make an appropriate contemporaneous objection and state the same ground with enough specificity to permit a ruling.

A hearing is not a substitute for a theory

McMillian does not mean that hearings on unlawfully obtained evidence are unimportant. Rule 104(c) provides that, in criminal cases, hearings on the admissibility of confessions or evidence alleged to have been obtained unlawfully are conducted outside the jury’s hearing and presence.

But the decision distinguishes a bona fide, sufficiently developed suppression issue from a conclusory request. In the Court’s view, the trial judge gave defense counsel an opportunity to elaborate outside the jury’s presence; the defense did not offer a legal or factual basis beyond an assertion of unreasonableness.

The practical point is simple: requesting a hearing does not eliminate the need to articulate the issue the hearing is supposed to decide.

Track two: an agreed sentence can still be illegal

The second case in McMillian involved a guilty plea to unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a Class D felony. The parties agreed to a five-year straight sentence. The sentence fell within the general statutory imprisonment range for the offense, but the Court held that it did not comply with the applicable presumptive sentencing standards and split-sentence requirements.

The sentencing worksheets showed a prison disposition and a recommended split-sentence range. The record did not show an asserted or found aggravating factor that would justify a departure. Under the governing framework for that sentencing event, the Court concluded that the straight five-year sentence was illegal.

The Court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Because the illegal sentence had been part of the plea agreement, the resentencing would amount to rejection of that agreement. The Court therefore held that the defendant must be allowed to withdraw the guilty plea if the defendant timely seeks withdrawal after resentencing. The defendant is not required to withdraw the plea.

The lesson is broader than one drug-possession case

The case is not a promise that every sentencing disagreement will invalidate a disposition. Its point is narrower and more important: counsel cannot stop the sentencing analysis at the statutory maximum or at the parties’ agreement.

For a covered offense, counsel should also determine whether the presumptive sentencing standards apply; review the proper worksheets and scoring; identify the recommended disposition and sentence-length range; assess any mandatory split-sentence or community-corrections requirement; and identify any proposed departure and the procedure supporting it.

An agreement between the prosecution and the defense does not authorize a court to impose an unlawful sentence.

A pre-plea and pre-sentencing audit

Before a client accepts a negotiated disposition, defense counsel should review the following:

Question

Why it matters

What is the exact offense of conviction and offense date?

The offense classification and governing sentencing law can depend on the charged offense and applicable version of the law.

Do the presumptive sentencing standards apply?

Covered offenses require more than a check of the general statutory sentencing range.

Are the correct worksheets complete and supported by the record?

Worksheet scoring affects the recommended disposition and sentence range.

What disposition does the worksheet recommend?

A prison, probation, drug-court, diversion, split-sentence, or community-corrections outcome may carry different legal requirements.

Does the proposed sentence comply with any applicable split-sentence statute?

A sentence can fall within the general statutory range yet still be illegal in its execution or disposition.

Is a departure proposed?

A departure requires attention to the applicable procedure and the factual basis for aggravating or mitigating factors.

Does the client understand the actual sentencing consequence?

The plea colloquy should accurately communicate the legally available punishment and disposition.

If the disposition changes, what happens to the plea agreement?

A corrected sentence may permit the client to seek withdrawal of a plea that was induced by an unlawful term.

The two-track criminal-defense checklist

Before the evidence comes in

• Identify all potential Fourth Amendment, statutory, and evidentiary suppression issues early.

• File a written, fact-specific motion when possible.

• Request the appropriate hearing and identify the evidence at issue.

• Obtain a clear ruling.

• If the issue arises at trial, object when the evidence is offered and state the particular ground.

• Preserve the relevant documents, video, warrant materials, reports, and hearing record.

Before the plea is accepted or sentence is imposed

• Confirm the offense class and statutory range.

• Determine whether the presumptive standards apply.

• Review the completed worksheets, scoring, and recommended outcome.

• Check any split-sentence, probation, community-corrections, or departure requirements.

• Compare the negotiated term to the legally authorized sentence and disposition.

• Explain to the client what will happen if the court cannot lawfully impose the negotiated sentence.

Bottom line

McMillian supplies a practical warning at two high-stakes points in a criminal case. First, a suppression issue must be raised timely and specifically; “unreasonable” is a conclusion, not a developed basis for exclusion. Second, a negotiated sentence must be legal, not merely agreeable.

The best defense practice is to build both reviews into the workflow: preserve the suppression record before the evidence reaches the jury, and audit the sentencing framework before the client enters a plea or the court announces sentence.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It discusses Alabama law and the particular procedural and sentencing posture in McMillian v. State. Counsel should verify the statutes, sentencing standards, worksheets, and procedural rules applicable to each individual case.

A no-contest clause can be an important estate-planning tool. It may discourage meritless will contests, protect family privacy, and reduce the prospect of expensive, destructive litigation. But a clause drafted too broadly can create a different kind of risk: it can appear to penalize a beneficiary for seeking basic information about an estate or for invoking court-supervised protections.

The Alabama Supreme Court’s recent decision in Banks v. Banks, SC-2024-0857 (Ala. Apr. 17, 2026) is a useful cautionary example. It involved a will that required beneficiary disputes to be presented to a private advisory committee and stated that the committee’s decisions would not be subject to judicial review. The dispute also implicated an in terrorem clause and a beneficiary’s request for an inventory and accounting.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below without an opinion under Rule 53. The case therefore should not be read as a Supreme Court merits holding that every private dispute-resolution mechanism or every forfeiture provision is enforceable. Separate writings emphasized preservation problems and raised substantial concerns about private decision makers determining forfeiture, judicial oversight of estate administration, and the special protection owed to minors.

For estate planners, personal representatives, and probate litigators, the practical lesson is clear: do not rely on broad no-contest or private-dispute provisions to do work that clear drafting, fiduciary transparency, and court-supervised procedure should do.

What happened in Banks

The dispute involved two beneficiaries of their father’s will. One beneficiary, acting through counsel, sought estate financial information and asked the circuit court to require the executor to provide an inventory and accounting. The executor maintained that the will required disputes to be resolved by a private advisory committee and argued that the beneficiary’s conduct triggered the will’s in terrorem clause.

The circuit court stayed the proceeding and referred the forfeiture question to the advisory committee. The committee concluded that the beneficiary had violated the will’s instructions and should be disinherited. The circuit court later entered a judgment embracing that result.

The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. In a concurring writing, Justice Shaw concluded that the beneficiary had meaningful opportunities to challenge the advisory-committee process but did not timely preserve a public-policy challenge to that process for appellate review. The dissenting writings expressed concern that the committee’s role and the potential forfeiture raised questions about judicial authority in estate administration and the court’s duty to protect a minor beneficiary whose relevant conduct occurred while he was still a minor.

The key point: Banks did not resolve every underlying policy question

The procedural posture matters. A Rule 53 no-opinion affirmance resolves the appeal, but it does not provide a written majority analysis of the enforceability of the will’s dispute-resolution and forfeiture provisions.

Accordingly, practitioners should resist two overbroad readings of Banks:

• It does not establish that a beneficiary’s request for an inventory or accounting always triggers an in terrorem clause.

• It does not establish that a testator can universally eliminate court review of estate disputes by directing all matters to a private committee.

The separate writings instead highlight unsettled and fact-sensitive questions: the clause’s actual wording, the relief sought by the beneficiary, the parties’ conduct in the trial court, the timing and adequacy of objections, and whether the affected beneficiary is a minor.

Why a request for an accounting deserves careful treatment

An inventory or accounting request is not necessarily a will contest. It may be part of legitimate fiduciary oversight—particularly when beneficiaries seek to understand estate assets, administration expenses, distributions, or the basis for a personal representative’s decisions.

A broadly written no-contest clause can create an avoidable conflict if it treats virtually any estate-related request, inquiry, petition, or lawsuit as a forfeiture event. That approach can chill beneficiaries from raising genuine concerns and can put the personal representative in the difficult position of characterizing routine transparency requests as hostile litigation.

The better planning question is not simply whether to include an in terrorem clause. It is whether the clause distinguishes a direct challenge to the will or an effort to defeat the dispositive scheme from good-faith requests for information, accountings, instructions, or fiduciary compliance.

Drafting lessons for estate planners

1. Define the prohibited conduct narrowly

If the client wants a no-contest provision, define the triggering conduct with precision. Avoid catch-all language that treats “any dispute,” “any proceeding,” or any request “in any way involving” the will or estate as a trigger.

A narrow definition helps the clause serve its intended purpose while reducing uncertainty about legitimate administration requests. It also gives the fiduciary, beneficiary, and court a clearer basis for analyzing alleged misconduct.

2. Address beneficiary information rights expressly

If confidentiality is important—for example, because an estate holds closely held business information—consider addressing the issue directly. The instrument can identify the information to be protected, establish reasonable procedures for access, and require appropriate confidentiality safeguards where legally permissible.

That is usually more defensible than forcing a beneficiary to choose between receiving no information and risking forfeiture by requesting it.

3. Do not assume private process can displace judicial oversight

A private advisory process may be useful as a voluntary mechanism for mediation, consultation, or family dispute management. But a provision purporting to make a private committee’s decision final, immune from any court review, and binding even on estate-administration issues raises heightened risk.

Banks shows why. The case involved a clause that purported to make the advisory committee’s decision unreviewable, and the separate writings raised concerns about the relationship between that private mechanism and judicial responsibility for estate administration. A planner seeking to use a private process should state its scope, procedures, decision-maker qualifications, conflicts standards, and relationship to the court’s lawful authority with great care.

4. Build special safeguards for minors and protected beneficiaries

The Banks record involved conduct taken on behalf of a beneficiary while that beneficiary was a minor. The dissenting justices emphasized the court’s protective role in matters involving minors and their property interests.

Whether or not a no-contest clause applies to adults, planners should be especially cautious about any mechanism that could impose forfeiture on a minor or protected person based on actions taken by a guardian, conservator, guardian ad litem, or lawyer. The instrument should not assume that a private process can supplant the safeguards that a court may be required to provide.

Administration lessons for personal representatives

A personal representative confronting a beneficiary information request should separate two questions:

1. What information or accounting is legally required or appropriate?

2. Does the beneficiary’s conduct actually fall within a narrowly construed forfeiture provision?

Those questions should not collapse into one another. An executor’s concern about confidentiality, family conflict, business operations, or disclosure to third parties may be legitimate. But the response should be proportionate: consider a confidentiality arrangement, a limited production, an agreed protocol, a petition for instructions, or other appropriate procedural means.

Seeking forfeiture is a serious step. Before asserting it, counsel should evaluate the text of the clause, the beneficiary’s actual conduct, the governing procedural posture, the potential consequences, and whether the asserted breach is sufficiently clear to support such an extraordinary remedy.

Litigation lesson: raise the authority and public-policy issues early

The concurring writing in Banks is a reminder that preservation can control an appeal. The beneficiary challenged the advisory process and the potential forfeiture in the trial court, but the concurrence concluded that a broader public-policy challenge to the committee’s authority was not properly presented for appellate review because it was raised too late.

The litigation lesson is straightforward: if a party contends that a testamentary dispute-resolution or forfeiture provision is unenforceable, exceeds the permissible scope of private dispute resolution, conflicts with judicial authority, or cannot be applied to a particular beneficiary, counsel should present the issue clearly and promptly in the trial court.

A litigant should not wait for an unfavorable private decision and then assume the court or appellate court will reach a newly framed challenge. The pleadings, motion practice, objections to referral, proposed orders, and postjudgment filings should all be coordinated around the specific issue counsel needs preserved.

A practical pre-forfeiture checklist

Before asserting that a beneficiary has forfeited an inheritance under a no-contest clause, consider the following:

Question

Why it matters

What is the clause’s exact triggering language?

Forfeiture provisions should be read carefully; broad conclusions based on generalized “dispute” language create risk.

What did the beneficiary actually do?

Distinguish a will contest or effort to defeat the dispositive plan from an information request, accounting request, or administration-related petition.

Was the beneficiary’s conduct taken directly, or by a fiduciary or representative?

This is especially significant when the beneficiary was a minor or protected person.

Is the private process clearly defined and procedurally fair?

Undefined decision makers, conflicts concerns, lack of notice, and the absence of meaningful review increase litigation risk.

What court authority remains implicated?

Estate administration, fiduciary accountings, and protection of minors may involve functions that cannot simply be assumed away.

Has the legal theory been preserved?

Timely objections and a clear trial-court record are essential if enforceability or public policy will be raised on appeal.

Is there a less drastic route?

Information protocols, confidentiality agreements, mediation, petitions for instructions, and targeted court relief may resolve the dispute without a forfeiture fight.

The planning takeaway

No-contest clauses remain useful when they are tailored to the client’s legitimate objectives. But the broadest clause is not always the strongest clause. A provision that threatens forfeiture for every dispute can deter legitimate oversight, produce ambiguous administration conflicts, and invite litigation over the clause itself.

A more durable plan will:

• identify the conduct the client truly wants to deter;

• preserve reasonable paths for beneficiaries to obtain appropriate estate information;

• use confidentiality and dispute-management provisions that are defined and workable;

• avoid assuming that private actors can conclusively replace a court’s role in every estate dispute; and

• address minors and protected persons with special care.

Bottom line

Banks is not a blanket answer to whether a no-contest clause may penalize a request for an accounting. The Supreme Court affirmed without a majority opinion, and the separate writings make clear that significant issues remained outside the scope of a merits holding.

Still, the case offers a valuable warning. Estate planners should draft forfeiture provisions narrowly. Personal representatives should not casually equate a request for information with a prohibited challenge. And litigators should preserve any objection to an asserted private dispute-resolution mechanism before the process produces an adverse result.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It addresses Alabama law and the procedural posture of Banks v. Banks; the enforceability of a particular no-contest or private dispute-resolution provision depends on the governing instrument, facts, and applicable law.

A custody-modification order can look complete—and still be unappealable.

That was the lesson in Conlee v. Conlee, CL-2026-0089 (Ala. Civ. App. July 17, 2026). The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals dismissed an appeal because the trial court had awarded the father “custody” and the mother visitation, but had not resolved the father’s request for final decision-making authority concerning the child’s academic and medical/dental care.

For divorce and family-law practitioners, the case is a reminder that physical custody, legal custody, and decision-making authority are separate questions. Resolving one does not necessarily resolve the others. And when a materially pleaded or tried issue remains unadjudicated, there may be no final judgment from which to appeal.

The problem in Conlee

The original divorce judgment gave the mother sole physical custody and the parties joint legal custody. In the later modification proceeding, the father sought a custody change and asked to receive final decision-making authority over the child’s academic and medical/dental decisions.

The modification order awarded the father “custody” and the mother visitation. It also stated that no child support would be ordered because the father was not seeking it. But the order did not address the requested legal-custody modification or final decision-making authority. It also did not state that unmodified provisions of the earlier divorce judgment remained in effect, and it did not include a general denial of relief not expressly granted.

The Court of Civil Appeals treated the custody award as an award of sole physical custody. But it concluded that the separate legal-custody request remained pending. Because the order did not completely adjudicate the claims and rights at issue, it was not final—and the mother’s appeal was dismissed.

Why the distinction matters

Under Alabama’s custody statute, physical custody concerns where the child lives and the allocation of custodial time. Legal custody concerns the right and responsibility to make major decisions about the child, including education, health care, and religious training. The court may preserve joint legal custody, award sole legal custody, or allocate final authority over particular decisions.

A judgment that changes the child’s primary residence or awards one parent visitation does not automatically answer who controls school enrollment, medical treatment, counseling, educational services, or other major decisions. Using broad shorthand—“custody,” “primary custody,” or “primary residential custody”—may create avoidable ambiguity.

That ambiguity carries two risks:

1. Client-management risk. Parents may leave court with fundamentally different understandings about who may make a major decision for the child.

2. Appellate-jurisdiction risk. If a requested legal-custody issue remains undecided, an appellate court may dismiss the appeal rather than reach the merits.

What did not make the order nonfinal

Conlee is also useful because it distinguishes an unresolved claim from an issue that simply was not awarded.

The Court held that the absence of a new child-support award did not prevent finality in that case. The father had withdrawn his request for support, and the order reflected that withdrawal. Likewise, the order’s failure to separately terminate the father’s prior support obligation did not make the judgment nonfinal under the circumstances before the Court.

The controlling defect was different: a specific request to alter legal custody and allocate final decision-making authority had been presented, but never decided.

The practical question for lawyers is therefore not, “Does the order cover every family-law topic that might arise?” It is: Does the order resolve every claim and form of relief actually pending or tried in this case?

A final-order checklist for custody-modification cases

Before submitting a proposed final judgment—or filing a notice of appeal—review the case against this checklist.

1. Identify each form of custody precisely

State separately whether the judgment awards or preserves:

• joint legal custody, sole legal custody, or a specific allocation of final decision-making authority;

• joint physical custody or sole physical custody;

• the parenting-time or visitation schedule; and

• decision-making authority for education, medical and dental care, mental-health treatment, religious training, and extracurricular activities, if those issues are disputed or allocated differently.

Do not rely on “custody” alone if the parties have presented a legal-custody issue. Use the statutory terminology and say what happens to the prior legal-custody provisions.

2. Match the judgment to the pleaded and tried relief

Compare the proposed order against:

• the petition and answer;

• counterclaims and amended pleadings;

• pretrial orders;

• requests made in motions and at trial; and

• issues tried by consent.

An issue can require resolution even if it was not perfectly pleaded. In Conlee, the father’s request for final academic and medical/dental decision-making authority had been raised at trial without objection. The Court treated that request as a live claim requiring adjudication.

3. Address support-related issues intentionally

If support is requested, the judgment should resolve the request. If a party withdraws the request, say so expressly. If the court reserves support for later determination, recognize that the reservation may affect finality.

The same discipline applies to health insurance, uninsured medical expenses, tax dependency, extracurricular expenses, and other support-adjacent matters. Whether each issue must be resolved in a particular case depends on the claims actually pending and the relief sought—but silence should be deliberate, not accidental.

4. Preserve or replace prior provisions clearly

A modification order should state which provisions of the prior judgment are modified and what remains effective. For example, the order can separately address:

• legal custody;

• physical custody and parenting time;

• support;

• medical insurance and unreimbursed expenses;

• relocation restrictions or notices;

• communication provisions; and

• any prior contempt, protection, or special decision-making terms that remain operative.

A clear residual provision is not a cure-all for an unresolved claim, but it helps prevent confusion about the continuing force of provisions that the court did not intend to change.

5. Conduct a finality audit before appeal

Appellate jurisdiction depends on a final judgment unless a recognized exception applies. Before filing the notice of appeal, ask:

• Is every claim resolved?

• Is every requested modification granted or denied?

• Are physical custody and legal custody both addressed where both were put at issue?

• Does the judgment leave a material decision for later without a basis for immediate appeal?

• Does the court need to enter a supplemental order before the appeal period begins?

A careful finality audit can prevent the expense and delay of an appeal that must be dismissed.

Practice pointers for trial counsel

Family-law lawyers can reduce the risk of a Conlee-type dismissal by making the requested relief easy to adjudicate:

• Use a relief chart. List each requested modification and the party’s requested disposition in the trial brief or proposed judgment.

• Seek a specific ruling. If legal custody or final decision-making is disputed, ask the court to rule expressly rather than relying on a generic custody label.

• Address the issue in postjudgment practice. If the order omits a material request, use the applicable postjudgment procedure to ask the court to clarify or adjudicate it before appealing.

• Draft for the parents who must live under the order. An order should let schools, doctors, counselors, and the parents identify who has authority without reconstructing the litigation record.

The broader lesson

Conlee does not create a new custody standard. Its value is more practical: it reinforces that family-law judgments must be complete enough to be final and clear enough to be administered.

A custody modification can change where a child lives while leaving legal decision-making unresolved. When that happens, the case may remain in the trial court, and an attempted appeal may go nowhere. The best time to solve that problem is before the final judgment is entered—not after an appeal is dismissed.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Practitioners should review the governing statutes, rules, prior judgment, pleadings, and complete record in each matter.

The Court’s five latest available entries are all dated July 10, 2026. Each is a certificate of judgment denying a petition for writ of certiorari without opinion.

That makes this a finality docket, not a new-doctrine docket. The orders end Supreme Court review in the individual matters and leave the underlying appellate dispositions in place, but they do not explain the Court’s reasoning, resolve a new legal issue, or create a new Supreme Court precedent.

The five latest entries

Case

Supreme Court docket

Lower court identified in the certificate

July 10 action

Ex parte Wilson

SC-2026-0471

Mobile Circuit Court CC-16-6799.61; Court of Criminal Appeals CR-2025-0427

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

Ex parte Myers

SC-2026-0369

Calhoun Circuit Court CV-25-900033; Court of Civil Appeals CL-2025-0533

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

Ex parte Sanders

SC-2026-0445

Montgomery Circuit Court CC-21-395.60; Court of Criminal Appeals CR-2025-0624

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

Ex parte Brown

SC-2026-0447

Dallas Circuit Court CC-77-341.62; Court of Criminal Appeals CR-2025-0850

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

Ex parte Sawyer

SC-2026-0421

Jefferson Circuit Court CC-02-2899.63; Court of Criminal Appeals CR-2025-0747

Writ denied; no opinion; certificate of judgment issued

What a no-opinion certiorari denial does—and does not—do

The July 10 orders show that the Court considered each petition and declined discretionary review. They do not state why review was denied. A denial therefore should not be characterized as the Supreme Court’s endorsement of every rationale in the Court of Criminal Appeals or Court of Civil Appeals decision below.

Equally important, these certificates are not opinions on the underlying criminal or civil claims. The public entries identify the originating trial and intermediate appellate docket numbers, but do not disclose the offense, civil cause of action, arguments raised in the petitions, or the legal analysis in the lower appellate rulings. Practitioners should obtain and analyze the underlying Court of Appeals disposition and certiorari papers before advising a client about the substantive effect of any individual denial.

The immediate procedural consequence: Supreme Court review is over

Each July 10 entry is styled as a certificate of judgment. Under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, when the Supreme Court denies a petition for certiorari, the certificate of judgment issues immediately. The certificates in these five cases expressly state that the Court’s judgment is certified on July 10 and address costs under Rule 35. Ala. R. App. P. 41.

For the parties, the practical consequence is that the Supreme Court phase has ended. Counsel should then confirm the resulting status in the intermediate appellate court and trial court, assess any further relief potentially available under the governing procedural framework, and communicate the finality consequences promptly to the client.

Criminal appellate practice: four of the five newest entries

Four of the five latest entries—Wilson, Sanders, Brown, and Sawyer—are petitions for certiorari from decisions of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.

For criminal practitioners, the recurring reminder is that Supreme Court certiorari is discretionary and tightly framed. In ordinary criminal cases, a rehearing application in the Court of Criminal Appeals is generally a prerequisite to certiorari. The certiorari petition must be filed within 14 days after the Court of Criminal Appeals acts on rehearing and must identify a recognized ground for review, such as a material first-impression question, conflict with specified appellate authority, or a qualifying constitutional or statutory ruling. Ala. R. App. P. 39.

A no-opinion denial underscores a practical point: counsel should develop the certiorari theory before the petition is due, not treat the petition as an opportunity to reargue every assignment of error. The petition must make the Rule 39 ground and the factual basis for it intelligible from the petition materials. When the underlying Court of Criminal Appeals disposition is an unpublished memorandum or lacks an adequate factual account, the statement-of-facts steps taken on rehearing can materially affect the Supreme Court’s ability to evaluate the petition.

Post-denial checklist for criminal counsel

• Obtain the Supreme Court certificate of judgment and preserve the lower appellate decision, rehearing materials, and certiorari petition in the client file.

• Confirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ certificate-of-judgment and remand status, if applicable.

• Review the disposition to determine what became final: conviction, sentence, postconviction ruling, or other criminal judgment. The Supreme Court certificates alone do not answer that question.

• Evaluate any remaining client-specific options under the appropriate procedural rules without representing that a no-opinion certiorari denial itself decided a new substantive issue.

• Give the client a clear written finality update that distinguishes the denial of discretionary review from an opinion on the merits.

The civil entry: Ex parte Myers

Ex parte Myers is the sole latest-entry petition from the Court of Civil Appeals. Its certificate identifies a Calhoun Circuit Court case involving the Board of Trustees of the Policemen’s and Firemen’s Retirement Fund, followed by Court of Civil Appeals case CL-2025-0533. The Supreme Court denied the petition without opinion and issued its certificate of judgment.

The same caution applies. The denial establishes that discretionary Supreme Court review will not proceed in that matter; it does not reveal which issue was raised, whether the Court agreed with the Court of Civil Appeals’ analysis, or what substantive proposition the lower decision supports. Attorneys working with the resulting Court of Civil Appeals disposition should assess its precedential status independently and read the decision itself rather than citing the certiorari denial as substantive approval.

Bottom line

The five latest Alabama Supreme Court entries are procedural dispositions issued on one day, not a set of five new merits opinions. They show the endpoint of discretionary review:

• all five petitions were denied without opinion;

• the Supreme Court certified its judgment the same day; and

• the operative substantive analysis, if any, remains in the underlying Court of Criminal Appeals or Court of Civil Appeals decisions.

For appellate practitioners, the useful lesson is disciplined certiorari practice and finality management. Build the Rule 39 ground early, preserve the necessary facts on rehearing, and treat a certiorari denial as an event that ends Supreme Court review—not as a judicial opinion resolving the issues presented.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It summarizes the five latest Alabama Supreme Court entries available before July 17, 2026, as reflected in the linked certificates of judgment and procedural rules.

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals issued 12 reported docket entries on July 17, 2026. Five are published opinions with concrete practice consequences; five are affirmances by unpublished memorandum; and two are orders overruling rehearing without an opinion on rehearing.

The published opinions share a practical theme: appellate outcomes often turn on procedure before the court ever reaches the merits. The Court addressed (1) how to compute and protect appeals from district court, (2) when a workers’ compensation claimant may obtain compelled medical care before proving compensability, (3) the finality hazards created by imprecise custody and juvenile orders, and (4) the highly deferential review of a joint-custody modification tried ore tenus.

The July 17 docket at a glance

Category

Decision

Disposition

Principal practice point

District-court appeal / jurisdiction

Ex parte Ford, CL-2026-0005

Mandamus granted in part

Claim-specific appeal periods and a clerk’s filing error can produce a split jurisdictional result.

Custody modification

Brazeale v. Gibson, CL-2025-0868

Affirmed

In a true joint-physical-custody modification, the Couch best-interest standard applies, but ore tenus deference remains formidable.

Juvenile / finality / adoption

K.W. v. B.P., CL-2025-0702 et al.

Appeals dismissed; mandamus denied

Consolidated actions retain separate identities, and a reservation of visitation for later reconsideration may defeat finality.

Domestic relations / finality

Conlee v. Conlee, CL-2026-0089

Appeal dismissed

A custody-modification order that leaves a tried legal-custody claim unresolved is not final.

Workers’ compensation

Ex parte Waterville USA, Inc., CL-2026-0390

Mandamus granted

Voluntary benefits and an authorized physician’s referral do not eliminate the need for an evidentiary basis when compensability remains disputed.

Memorandum affirmances

A.L. (CL-2025-1023); A.L. (CL-2025-1026); Roden; Carroll; Triggs

Affirmed by unpublished memorandum

Dispositions resolve the individual appeals but do not add citable precedent.

Rehearing dispositions

G.M.B. v. J.J.B.; Miller v. Hickman

Rehearing overruled

Procedural finality events; the July 17 notices state no additional reasoning.

1. Ex parte Ford: Treat the appeal deadline as claim-specific, and do not let a clerk’s error obscure the analysis

Ex parte Ford arose from a district-court action involving a mobile-home purchase agreement, a detinue claim for the home, and an unlawful-detainer claim for the lot. After the circuit court entered an interlocutory order favorable to the defendant on appeal, the plaintiff sought mandamus, arguing that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the appeal from district court was untimely.

The Court’s result was deliberately divided. It held that the appeal of the unlawful-detainer component was untimely and directed dismissal of that portion. It held that the appeals of the breach-of-contract and detinue components were timely—despite their later file stamp—because the appellant had made a timely, good-faith attempt to file them but the clerk refused the filing based on an erroneous demand for a supersedeas bond.

The holdings practitioners should use

• Do not assume the Alabama Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act supplies the appeal rule. The Court concluded that the AURLTA did not govern a purchaser’s occupancy under a contract of sale of a mobile home or a separate lot-only agreement. The transaction’s labels and the property actually rented matter.

• Identify the deadline claim by claim. The unlawful-detainer claim was subject to its own seven-day appeal provision; the contract and detinue claims were subject to the general 14-day district-court civil appeal period. A combined complaint does not create a single universal appellate deadline.

• A late order cannot revive a postjudgment motion already denied by operation of law. The district court’s postjudgment motion had expired under Rule 59.1(dc) before the court purported to deny it in writing. That later order was a nullity for deadline purposes.

• Equitable treatment of clerk error has a hard boundary. Under the Court’s application of Ex parte G.L.C., a litigant who timely tenders a filing but is wrongly rebuffed by judicial staff may be treated as timely. But equitable relief cannot repair a failure to tender the filing before the statutory deadline.

• A supersedeas bond is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal. The Court held that the clerk erred by refusing the notice of appeal for failure to post a bond equal to twice the judgment; Rule 62(dc) and the applicable authorities do not make such a bond a jurisdictional condition to an appeal.

Practice takeaway

For any district-court appeal involving mixed claims, prepare a deadline matrix before filing: list each claim, its governing statute or rule, the postjudgment-motion deadline, the deemed-denial date, and the notice-of-appeal deadline. If a clerk refuses a timely tender, preserve proof immediately—time, office, employee, reason given, and tendered documents. A later declaration that a filing was blocked may be vital, but it will not help where the statutory deadline had already expired.

2. Ex parte Waterville USA: A referral is not a substitute for proof of compensability

In Ex parte Waterville USA, Inc., a workers’ compensation claimant sought to compel an employer to schedule a second-opinion consultation recommended by an authorized treating physician. The employer had denied liability and disputed compensability, causation, and permanent injury. The circuit court granted the motion without receiving evidence; the Court of Civil Appeals issued mandamus directing that the order be vacated.

The Court applied Ex parte Publix Super Markets, Inc.: where compensability is genuinely disputed, a claimant cannot obtain compelled medical treatment through a stand-alone pretrial motion based only on allegations. The court must have a procedurally proper basis—such as a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment—or an evidentiary determination of the threshold facts supporting entitlement to treatment.

What the decision means in practice

• Payers should distinguish voluntary benefits from acceptance of liability. The employer’s prior payment of medical and temporary-total-disability benefits did not admit compensability. The Court relied on both the Workers’ Compensation Act and Rule 409 of the Alabama Rules of Evidence in rejecting an estoppel theory.

• Claimants should select the correct procedural vehicle. If compensability is denied, a motion to compel alone is not enough. Counsel should consider whether the record supports summary judgment, an evidentiary hearing on compensability, or an expedited trial process consistent with the Act.

• An authorized provider’s recommendation does not resolve a live compensability dispute. The referral principle recognized in cases involving accepted claims does not override an employer’s preserved right to contest whether the underlying injury is compensable.

• Mandamus remains the vehicle for correcting an improper interlocutory treatment order. The employer filed within the presumptively reasonable Rule 21 period and obtained relief before being required to fund disputed treatment.

3. K.W. v. B.P.: Consolidation does not merge cases, and a provisional visitation arrangement is not final

K.W. v. B.P. involved six related juvenile matters—dependency and custody actions plus a transferred adoption proceeding. The juvenile court entered an order in one numbered action that purported to resolve claims across several consolidated cases, awarded custody to nonparent custodians, and reserved the ability to adjust the mother’s visitation through a future date. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed all appeals from the dependency/custody actions as nonfinal and denied the mother’s mandamus petition seeking a final judgment in the separate adoption action.

Two finality failures, two different lessons

First: consolidated cases keep their separate identities. The Court reaffirmed that a final judgment must be entered in each distinct action. An order captioned and entered only in one case does not become final in the companion cases merely because its text discusses or purports to resolve them. Counsel should confirm the case number in the caption, the docket entry, and the actual entry of judgment in each action—particularly in juvenile cases with accumulated “.02,” “.03,” or later-numbered proceedings.

Second: do not label an order final while reserving a material custody or visitation question. The juvenile court’s order reserved jurisdiction to adjust visitation and stated that the visitation arrangement would become final later unless a party moved to reconsider it. That language signaled that the court had not reached a terminal adjudication. The Court applied its finality precedent and dismissed the appeal rather than treating the order as a final custody judgment.

Adoption-practice point

The Court also denied mandamus seeking a prompt final judgment in the transferred adoption action. The juvenile court had indicated that it would address adoption after final judgments in the intertwined dependency and custody matters. That was not a refusal to act, so the parent had not established the clear legal right and imperative duty required for mandamus.

Practice takeaway

In a multi-case family or juvenile matter, build a judgment-control sheet identifying every action number, each claim pending in that action, whether consolidation has occurred, and the judgment that must be entered in that case. Before taking an appeal, verify that the order resolves all claims in the specific case and does not defer a material aspect of custody, visitation, or support. If an appeal is premature, the client may lose time and resources while the trial court must reenter or clarify orders.

4. Conlee v. Conlee: Physical custody may be resolved while legal custody remains an unadjudicated claim

In Conlee v. Conlee, the circuit court awarded the father “custody” and the mother visitation after a modification proceeding, but did not expressly resolve the father’s request for final decision-making authority over academic and medical/dental issues. The Court of Civil Appeals interpreted “custody” in context as sole physical custody, but dismissed the appeal because the legal-custody request remained unresolved.

The decision supplies a useful distinction. The trial court’s failure to award child support did not destroy finality, because the father had withdrawn his support request and the court had memorialized that withdrawal. Nor did the failure to separately terminate the father’s former support obligation make the order nonfinal; a parent who becomes the custodial parent is no longer entitled to receive, and no longer obligated to pay, the prior support under the circumstances addressed by the Court. But a specifically requested modification of legal custody and final decision-making authority was still pending.

Drafting and trial-management lessons

• Use the statutory custody vocabulary in Ala. Code § 30-3-151. “Custody,” “primary,” or “residential” terminology can obscure whether the court has resolved physical custody, legal custody, or both.

• Plead and list physical custody, legal custody, decision-making authority, support, medical coverage, and uninsured-expense allocation as distinct requested forms of relief.

• Make sure the final judgment addresses each item actually tried, including issues tried by consent.

• Include an unambiguous residual clause where appropriate—such as preservation of unmodified provisions or denial of relief not expressly granted—but recognize that boilerplate cannot cure a judgment that is substantively unclear about a tried claim.

For appellate counsel, Conlee reinforces the need to audit finality even when neither party flags it: the Court has a duty to dismiss an appeal from a nonfinal order on its own motion.

5. Brazeale v. Gibson: The right standard is only the beginning in a joint-custody modification appeal

Brazeale v. Gibson affirmed the denial of a mother’s petition to replace an existing true joint-physical-custody arrangement with sole physical custody. The majority held that the Ex parte Couch best-interest standard—not the more demanding Ex parte McLendon standard—governed because the prior judgment awarded the parties joint physical custody with an approximately equal custodial arrangement.

That conclusion did not produce reversal. The trial court had not expressly named the governing standard, but the Court presumed the trial court knew and correctly applied the law, particularly where the mother’s postjudgment motion brought the issue to the court’s attention. The record contained conflicting testimony concerning each parent’s conduct, the child’s expressed views, mental-health concerns, and educational issues. Under ore tenus review, the appellate court declined to reweigh that evidence.

Judge Hanson, joined by Judge Bowden, dissented. The dissent viewed the record as too unclear to support a presumption that the trial court had applied the less stringent Couch standard and encouraged trial courts to state the custody standard on the record or in the judgment.

Practice takeaway

For trial counsel, Brazeale is a reminder to make the applicable modification standard explicit:

• identify the existing custody allocation precisely;

• state why Couch or McLendon governs;

• tie the evidence and proposed findings to that standard; and

• ask the court to identify the standard applied in its ruling, especially where the record presents close factual disputes.

For appellate counsel, the case shows the difficulty of converting evidence-heavy custody concerns into reversible error without a clear legal misapplication, an inadequate evidentiary basis, or a record that affirmatively demonstrates error. A postjudgment motion can preserve the standard-of-review argument, but a silent judgment will ordinarily receive the presumption that the court followed the law.

The remaining July 17 entries: outcomes without new citable doctrine

The Court also issued five affirmances by unpublished memorandum:

• A.L. v. Calhoun County Department of Human Resources, CL-2025-1023, from Calhoun Juvenile Court;

• A.L. v. Calhoun County Department of Human Resources, CL-2025-1026, from Calhoun Juvenile Court;

• Roden v. Galloway, CL-2025-0888, from DeKalb Circuit Court;

• Carroll v. Carroll, CL-2025-1025, from Shelby Circuit Court; and

• Triggs v. Triggs, CL-2025-0488, from Chilton Circuit Court.

It also overruled rehearing, without a written rehearing opinion, in G.M.B. v. J.J.B., CL-2025-0545, and Miller v. Hickman, CL-2026-0186.

Under Rule 54, a no-opinion affirmance or memorandum issued by the Court of Civil Appeals has no precedential value and cannot be cited in arguments or briefs, except for limited preclusion purposes. Ala. R. App. P. 54. Likewise, the two July 17 rehearing notices do not add reasoning beyond the Court’s earlier dispositions. Lawyers should obtain and assess the underlying memoranda and case records for client-specific review, but should not treat these short entries as broad substantive authority.

Bottom line

The Court’s July 17 docket is best read as a procedure-and-finality docket:

• protect each applicable district-court appeal deadline and document any clerk-caused filing barrier;

• do not bypass a contested compensability determination with a free-standing motion to compel workers’ compensation treatment;

• enter a separate final judgment in every consolidated action;

• resolve every pleaded or tried dimension of custody—particularly legal decision-making authority—before appealing; and

• in custody modification litigation, make the governing standard explicit and develop the record with ore tenus deference in mind.

This article is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. It summarizes the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals’ July 17, 2026 docket and does not substitute for review of the complete opinions, orders, rules, and record in an individual matter.

For Alabama criminal practitioners, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ July 17, 2026 docket is not a source of new merits doctrine. It is, however, a useful reminder that the decisive work in a memorandum-affirmance appeal often occurs before rehearing is denied.

The Court issued five criminal-case entries that day—Moore, B.T.H., Jenkins, Pride, and Osborne. In each, the Court overruled an application for rehearing. Each case had been affirmed by memorandum on June 18, 2026.

That combination matters. A memorandum affirmance may dispose of the client’s direct appeal without producing an opinion that can be cited in the next case. And once rehearing is denied, counsel’s immediate task is no longer to persuade the Court of Criminal Appeals; it is to decide promptly whether a discretionary certiorari petition is justified and whether the rehearing application has preserved an adequate factual platform for that petition.

The July 17 docket at a glance

Case

Trial court

June 18 disposition

July 17 action

Listed author of June disposition

Moore v. State, CR-2025-1010

Colbert Circuit Court, CC-24-118

Affirmed by memorandum

Rehearing overruled

Judge Kellum

B.T.H. v. State, CR-2025-0321

Houston Circuit Court, CC-23-509

Affirmed by memorandum

Rehearing overruled

Judge Anderson

Jenkins v. State, CR-2025-0705

Sumter Circuit Court, CC-17-72

Affirmed by memorandum

Rehearing overruled

Judge Kellum

Pride v. State, CR-2025-0847

Madison Circuit Court, CC-22-2093

Affirmed by memorandum

Rehearing overruled

Judge Anderson

Osborne v. State, CR-2025-0269

Mobile Circuit Court, CC-22-3881

Affirmed by memorandum

Rehearing overruled

Judge Cole

Since all of these cases’ requests for rehearing were overruled without a published opinion, the discussion below therefore addresses what the docket establishes and the appellate procedure it triggers—not the underlying merits of any individual conviction.

Why five memorandum affirmances and rehearing denials do not create a new body of authority

Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 54 permits the Court of Criminal Appeals to affirm without a published opinion when an opinion would serve no significant precedential purpose. The Court must prepare a memorandum addressing the appellant’s contentions and its reasons for rejecting them, but the text of such memoranda is not published in the official reports. Critically, a no-opinion affirmance or memorandum has no precedential value and may not be cited in arguments or briefs, except for specified preclusion-type uses: law of the case, res judicata, collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, or procedural bar. Ala. R. App. P. 54.

Accordingly, the five June affirmances cannot be mined as citable support for a general proposition about suppression, jury instructions, sentencing, sufficiency, or preservation. Nor does the July 17 denial of rehearing convert them into precedent. The value of this docket is procedural and strategic: it illustrates where counsel must build a record when a direct appeal is resolved by unpublished memorandum.

The real appellate lesson: rehearing is a preservation event

In a non-State-pretrial criminal appeal, rehearing in the Court of Criminal Appeals is a prerequisite to Alabama Supreme Court certiorari review. An unsuccessful party must file the rehearing application and supporting brief within 14 days of the decision; the application must identify with particularity the law or facts the party believes the appellate court overlooked or misapprehended. Ala. R. App. P. 40.

That rule makes rehearing more than a final request to the intermediate court. In a memorandum case, it is counsel’s opportunity to protect the factual presentation that will be available if the case goes to the Supreme Court.

The statement-of-facts requirement in a memorandum case

Rule 40(e) draws a critical distinction:

• If the court’s opinion or unpublished memorandum includes a statement of facts and counsel disputes it, the rehearing application may include a proposed additional or corrected statement of facts, or counsel’s own statement.

• If the opinion or unpublished memorandum does not contain a statement of facts, the rehearing applicant must include a statement of facts in the application.

That fact statement should be built as if it may be copied verbatim into a certiorari petition. It should be concise, record-specific, and organized around the certiorari-worthy question—not merely a chronology or a reargued statement from the appellant’s brief. Counsel should cross-check every material proposition to the clerk’s record or reporter’s transcript and should include the facts that make the asserted conflict, constitutional question, first-impression issue, or other Rule 39 ground intelligible.

The reason is mechanical as well as strategic. If the Court of Criminal Appeals does not incorporate the requested fact statement in a subsequent opinion or memorandum, Rule 39 requires the certiorari petitioner to reproduce the statement presented on rehearing verbatim, with record references, and verify that it is the same statement. The Alabama Supreme Court ordinarily limits its review to the facts stated in the intermediate court’s opinion, unless the petitioner uses this Rule 39(d)(5) procedure. Ala. R. App. P. 39.

What to test before seeking rehearing

A strong rehearing analysis should not simply refile the merits brief. Before filing, appellate counsel should ask:

1. What proposition did the memorandum actually reject? Identify the precise legal step that controls the result—preservation, standard of review, statutory construction, harmless error, sufficiency, sentencing authority, or a constitutional claim.

2. What did the Court overlook or misapprehend? Rule 40 requires particularity. Pinpoint a record fact, authority, procedural posture, or logical consequence that the memorandum did not address correctly.

3. Is the factual statement sufficient for a later certiorari petition? If not, cure it in the rehearing application. Do not assume the Supreme Court will examine the record before deciding whether to issue the writ.

4. Can the issue be framed under Rule 39(a)? In a non-death-penalty case, discretionary certiorari grounds include a material first-impression question for the Supreme Court, conflict with specified prior appellate authority, certain constitutional or statutory rulings, effects on a class of public officers, or a request to overrule controlling Alabama Supreme Court precedent.

5. Is the remedy and client objective clear? The value of a certiorari petition may differ substantially depending on whether the issue affects retrial exposure, a mandatory sentence, jail-credit calculation, probation consequences, a collateral proceeding, or a recurring legal question.

What July 17 changes—and what it does not

The five July 17 orders overruled rehearing. They did not modify the June 18 memorandum affirmances, reveal additional reasoning, or generate citable precedent. For each appellant, however, the rehearing ruling begins the next appellate window.

Under Rule 39(c), a petition for writ of certiorari from a Court of Criminal Appeals decision must be filed within 14 days of the decision on the rehearing application. Certiorari is discretionary, not a second appeal as of right. The petition must state a recognized Rule 39 ground, give a direct and concise supporting argument, and attach both the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion or unpublished memorandum and the rehearing order or notice. Ala. R. App. P. 39.

The rule expressly accounts for a conflict claim where the lower court issued no opinion or no language that can be quoted: counsel must state that the conflict provision applies and explain with particularity how the decision conflicts with prior authority. That is important in a memorandum-affirmance case, but it is not a relaxed standard. The petition must still make the conflict—or another Rule 39 ground—clear from the materials the Supreme Court has before it on preliminary review.

Calendar and finality: do not treat the rehearing denial as the end of the case

Rule 41 provides that, absent an order changing the time, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ certificate of judgment issues 18 days after entry of an order denying rehearing. A timely certiorari petition stays issuance of that certificate until the Supreme Court finally disposes of the petition. Ala. R. App. P. 41.

For lawyers handling a July 17 rehearing denial, the core calendaring tasks are therefore:

• calculate the Rule 39 certiorari deadline from the July 17 order;

• determine promptly whether retained or appointed representation includes Supreme Court review and communicate that scope to the client;

• obtain and preserve the Court of Criminal Appeals memorandum, rehearing application, supporting brief, and rehearing order;

• verify whether the rehearing application contains the fact statement required by Rule 40(e) and the record citations needed by Rule 39(d)(5); and

• separately evaluate any postconviction, sentence-administration, or collateral consequences deadlines that may be affected by finality.

The last point is especially important. Direct-appeal finality can interact with later litigation choices, but the July 17 entries do not themselves resolve those downstream questions. Counsel should analyze them from the record, judgment, sentence, and applicable procedural rules in the particular case.

Case-by-case docket notes

Moore v. State — Colbert Circuit Court

Moore v. State, CR-2025-1010, arose from Colbert Circuit Court case CC-24-118. Judge Kellum’s June 18 entry reflects an affirmance by memorandum; the July 17 order overruled rehearing. The public docket materials do not identify the appellate claims. The immediate appellate question is whether the rehearing papers preserved a statement of facts and a Rule 39 ground adequate for discretionary Supreme Court review.

B.T.H. v. State — Houston Circuit Court

B.T.H. v. State, CR-2025-0321, arose from Houston Circuit Court case CC-23-509. Judge Anderson’s June 18 memorandum affirmance remained unchanged when rehearing was overruled on July 17. The public entries provide no basis to characterize the underlying offense, evidence, or legal issue. Lawyers reviewing the file should focus on the unpublished memorandum, the rehearing application, and the contemporaneous record citations before deciding whether the case presents a certiorari-worthy conflict or other Rule 39 ground.

Jenkins v. State — Sumter Circuit Court

Jenkins v. State, CR-2025-0705, came from Sumter Circuit Court case CC-17-72. Judge Kellum’s June 18 memorandum affirmance was followed by a July 17 rehearing denial. The older trial-court case number should not be used to infer the nature of the appeal or the sentence; the available appellate entries do not provide that information. The relevant practitioner task is to determine whether the unpublished memorandum’s reasoning conflicts with published authority or rests on an issue suitable for Supreme Court review.

Pride v. State — Madison Circuit Court

Pride v. State, CR-2025-0847, arose from Madison Circuit Court case CC-22-2093. Judge Anderson’s June 18 memorandum affirmance remained in force after the July 17 rehearing denial. As with the other entries, the orders are not authority on any substantive criminal-law question. The appellate file—not the case caption or short docket entry—must drive counsel’s assessment of remaining review and client advice.

Osborne v. State — Mobile Circuit Court

Osborne v. State, CR-2025-0269, arose from Mobile Circuit Court case CC-22-3881. Judge Cole’s June 18 entry reflects an affirmance by memorandum, and the Court denied rehearing on July 17. For any possible certiorari petition, counsel should confirm that the rehearing application did more than reassert trial-level errors: it needed to identify the specific overlooked point and, where needed, supply the factual statement required to support Supreme Court review.

Bottom line for Alabama criminal practitioners

This was a finality docket, not a new-doctrine docket. The Court of Criminal Appeals resolved five rehearing applications in cases it had already affirmed by memorandum. Because Rule 54 makes those memorandum dispositions nonprecedential and noncitable (subject to narrow exceptions), there is no new substantive rule to import into a brief or motion.

The docket’s practical lesson is more durable: when a criminal appeal is decided by unpublished memorandum, rehearing is the moment to create a disciplined appellate record for discretionary certiorari. Counsel should frame the overlooked legal or factual point with precision, include the required fact statement when the memorandum does not state facts, preserve record citations, and make an early, candid Rule 39 assessment. Once rehearing is denied, the 14-day certiorari period and the certificate-of-judgment clock leave little room to reconstruct an incomplete application.

This article is for general informational purposes and is not legal advice. It addresses the five Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entries issued July 17, 2026, and the applicable Alabama appellate rules; it does not purport to summarize the undisclosed issues or reasoning in the underlying criminal appeals.

I’m in Kyle Pierce, an Alabama Criminal Defense and Litigation Attorney with offices in Gadsden and Birmingham. I practice with my wife, Beth Clayton Pierce, at Pierce & Pierce Attorneys, PLLC, where we lead a dedicated team of professionals who get up every day to fight for our clients and provide comfort in stressful seasons of life.

Before entering practice, I completed law school at Samford University’s Cumberland School of Law after receiving a B.A. in Communications from The University of Alabama. (Roll Tide!) I’ve written for statewide news and entertainment publications, edited legal treatises, and reported for broadcast networks.

I decided to start Alabama Courtroom Practice, because I believe there’s a need for easy to access and easy to understand resources discussing what really happens in Alabama’s courtrooms. Not just the law - the practical applications and what they mean.

This is a vehicle primarily for lawyers to discuss ideas, implications of recent cases, and review best practices for the things that real lawyers do daily across Alabama, but my goal is still to present things in such a way that nonlawyers can understand the goals and best premise.

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